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 Abstract 
The end of the Second World War was brought about by the combined efforts of the 
Grand Alliance between President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill of Great Britain and Marshal Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union. Even though 
the Allies of the Second World War were one of the few examples of successful alliance 
throughout history, the alliance was not formed simply for the greater good of humanity but one 
of necessity. Beneath the atmosphere of cooperation, each leader aimed to satisfy the war aims of 
their own but despite their differences. However, none was allowed or willing to set aside the 
differences as national interests were at stake. My work will examine the interactions between 
the leaders of the three nations and how they fight among themselves to get their way while at 
the same time trying to win against a common foe. Before the three successfully defeated their 
enemy or even fought one, they waged their own war on the table to protect their national 
interests against their own allies. 
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Prelude 
On the 28th of June, 1919, the First World War ended and Treaty of Versailles was 
signed. The treaty was thought to bring an end to the era of war while the aggressor, Germany 
had their Carthaginian peace as a price of its crime. This „peace‟ treaty ironically was the cause 
of the Second World War just a few decades later. It was not long until Germany was not able to 
take the punishment quietly any longer. During the difficult times in Germany, a young Austrian, 
Adolf Hitler, quickly ascended into a position of power. Beginning in 1933, the fuhrer of Nazi 
Germany mobilized Germany for war, breaking the silence and the treaty. By 1936, Nazi 
Germany formed an Alliance with Fascist Italy lead by Benito Mussolini as war torn Europe 
watched in terror. By 1938, Hitler was also joined by the Japanese Empire. By 1939, The Red 
Tsar of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin signed a nonaggression pact with Hitler. The future was 
looking Grim for both Europe and the Pacific. 
Far removed from the conflict, war was not the concern of an average American. 
Initially, the United States‟ primary concerns were their economy. In 1933, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was elected president due to his promise to solve the social and economic problems of 
the Great Depression left behind by President Harding before him. Be that as it may, the 
president, however, was not ignorant to Hitler‟s growing power. The evolution of American 
involvement in World War II began with Roosevelt‟s genuine concern about the German 
expansion to him figuring out a better way to maintain world peace. 
His first interactions with the notorious Fuhrer were even before Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill began writing Roosevelt their first of the many letters. As early as 1938, Roosevelt 
even tried to no avail to discourage Hitler from attacking the Rhineland which was a part of the 
prelude to the Second World War. As the conflict raged on, Roosevelt was not able to become 
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overly involved as the United States prioritized its neutral status. The American aid policy to 
Great Britain prior to the Lend-Lease Acts was simply an agreement to trade arms with one 
another. 
After the fall of France, Churchill needed more support from the United States as Great 
Britain was too low on cash to make any purchase.
1
 The escalation in the degree of involvement 
was caused by necessity. Lend-Lease was then created along with its controversy among the 
public. By the time Churchill was desperate to travel to the United States in August, 1941; Great 
Britain had already been bombarded by the German Luftwaffe during the Blitzkrieg.  France was 
defeated, Spain was having a civil war, Italy joined Hitler and Great Britain barely survived the 
bombing. At that point, it was clear that Hitler could no longer be stopped by Europe alone 
without support. Fortunately, by the time Churchill arrived, Stalin and Hitler, two of the most 
powerful nations already broke their relations and fought one another. With Russia highly likely 
to cooperate in fighting the Germans, there finally was hope for those who aimed to survive 
against Hitler. 
Over the course of the Second World War, three ideological enemies clashed among one 
another just to make sure they survive the Axis atrocities. The turn of events brought the three 
unlikely nations together out of sheer desperation. The anti-Bolshevik British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, an anti-imperialist American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Red 
Tsar of the Communist, Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union was to somehow jointly 
complete the prime objective of defeating Hitler. The three had their own ideas of effective 
strategies and different conditions for them to work, the compromises had to be made and some 
sacrifices were necessary. And through years of in fighting on the tables, and The Second World 
War was won on the field of battle. Beneath the atmosphere of cooperation in the eyes of the 
                                               
1
 Harriman, Averell W., Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 56 
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public was the battle of wits, deception and manipulation to get one another to follow the 
strategy that benefitted one‟s nation alone. 
Though the three aimed to see the demise of Hitler, their reasons were different. 
Churchill aimed to ensure the survival of Great Britain as well as her oversea territories. 
Therefore his basic strategies were aiming towards reestablishing controls of these regions as 
well as fighting Hitler resulting in a less direct approach to defeat him. Roosevelt aimed to 
ultimately be rid of old peacekeeping systems that never seemed to work namely the sphere of 
influence and the balance of power. His strategies were aimed towards minimizing the capturing 
of unnecessary territories that would complicate their eventual liberation in preparation for his 
postwar peace plans, the United Nations. Stalin cared little for much else but the future of 
Russia. His strategies were aimed only towards ending the war quickly and establishing an 
effective sphere of influence to act as a buffer zone to protect Soviet Russia from future attacks. 
The three polar opposites were to somehow work together against enemies who shared 
similar ideologies with one another. As history had proven, through incredible amount of loss of 
both lives and properties, the Allies emerged victorious in a seemingly hopeless situation as they 
were on the losing side when it began. War was won thanks to the architects of victory waging 
war among themselves during the war in which they would continue to do for peace. 
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Chapter I: The Herald 
 Being an ocean apart from the conflict, the most immediate concern for the United States 
was not in Europe during the period between in 1939 but the economy. The United States 
suffered some economic losses after the First World War, prompting President Warren G. 
Harding to push for the call for normalcy removing high wartime taxes in 1920 thus, stimulated 
economy by leaving more money in the hands of the people which encouraged spending. So 
began the prosperous period known as the Roaring Twenties. Unfortunately, as explosive as the 
economy was rose, the American economy fell to pieces in a heartbeat. The economic bubble 
began forming in the early 1920s until it busted when the productions became so massive that no 
amount of consumption can ever match it, leading up to the economic decline in 1929. 
For once, the nation united under the struggle which everybody shared. Every political 
faction set aside their differences for the time being and demanded that the President must do 
anything that was necessary to fix the problems. Franklin Delano Roosevelt won his first 
presidential election in 1932. Roosevelt spent his first few months in office coming up with 
answers to fix the economic mess that the United States was in. His relief, recovery and reform 
program was known as the New Deal was considered highly progressive during its time. Even 
then some of his ideas were also much more progressive even by New Deal standard and some 
of the American public was not ready for them.
2
 This skepticism resulted in the president himself 
becoming a subject of many controversies to the eyes of the public, the notion which soon 
became somewhat significant when the United States became involved in the conflict overseas 
during his third term and the president needed the public confidence. 
                                               
2
 One of them being the Social Security program which remained controversial even to this day 
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While there were many issues present in the domestic front, the sparks of conflict had 
been present in Europe ever since the earliest days of Roosevelt‟s presidency. The rise of Hitler 
did not escape the president‟s attention. His first interactions with the notorious Fuhrer were 
even before Prime Minister Churchill began writing Roosevelt their first of the many letters. As 
early as 1938, Roosevelt was already communicating with Hitler concerning his idea of invading 
the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia which Hitler assured that the future of the region also 
depended on the will of its government, a promise that history proved to be false. Despite being a 
great distance from the conflict, the growing war potential of Nazi Germany had always been 
President Roosevelt‟s concern.  
The British prime minister had been in contact with the president of the United States 
from as early as 1939. They have written each other over 1900 letters and telegrams over the 
span of the six years spent in contact with one another.
3
 Despite the criticism regarding 
neutrality, Roosevelt felt that the coming war in Europe would not only have been a war of 
military conquest but also one of ideologies. The president knew that his actions might have 
jeopardized the neutral status of the United States but he still felt that it was necessary to aid 
Great Britain against Germany. He saw the possibility of the world being dominated by the 
mighty Axis powers had Great Britain been defeated and the United States remained unprepared 
both mentally and materially. He felt that American intervention was necessary to end the 
conflict and strive towards the future of peace.
4
 
While the president was concerned about the crisis in Europe and many Americans were 
more or less sympathetic towards the Europeans, they also had more immediate concerns at the 
time. As mentioned earlier, an average American person was much more concerned about 
                                               
3
 Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. I,  p. 3 
4
 Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-1943, p. 72 
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whether or not they or their family would starve. Additionally, most people who were alive 
during the Great depression were also alive during the First World War; some even fought and 
survived it. With the two reasons, the American public was leaning towards isolationism.
5
 The 
earlier public opinion preferred the government to spend their effort improving the domestic 
economy not fighting foreign enemies. One of Roosevelt‟s campaigning speeches was a promise 
that no Americans was going to war. 
Despite his promise to the American people, Roosevelt still felt that funding Great Britain 
was necessary to prevent the possibility of war reaching the United States and by then the 
American people would truly be at war and would be unprepared at that.
6
 Strategic bombing by 
Nazi bombers almost defeated Great Britain during the Blitzkrieg. The United Kingdom required 
some substantial support or it would have fallen. On March 11, 1941, the United States took a 
first subtle yet significant step away from isolationism by passing the Lend Lease Act. The 
legislation allowed the United States to support the British war efforts without actually going 
against the Neutrality Acts. Ever since then, the United States had been supplying Great Britain 
with not only military equipment to fight against the Germans but also providing considerable 
amount logistical support to contribute to their war effort without American combatants actually 
being involved. 
While the Roosevelt did not violate the Neutrality Act in words, he did in spirit because 
endorsing a side, let alone financially supporting it, was contradictory to the very concept of 
neutrality. The result of passing the Lend-Lease Acts also subjected Roosevelt to the skepticism 
of the American people in which he replied with his famous fire on the neighbor‟s house analogy 
as in he was simply lending the supplies to a nation struggling in war much similarly to an act of 
                                               
5
 McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia,1941-46, p. 3 
6
 Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-1943, p. 82 
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a neighbor lending a gardening hose to put out the fire before it reaches his own house. 
Roosevelt‟s analogy faced the counterargument from his Republican oppositions that Lend-
Lease was, realistically, more of a situation of lending a chewing gum to someone meaning that 
the supplies being sent over to Great Britain were not likely to be returned.
7
 
In addition to supporting Great Britain, Roosevelt also expressed his disapproval towards 
the Axis by hindering their finance. In effect, this action made the United States the enemy of the 
Axis which moved the United States even further away from neutrality. The United States began 
freezing the assets of Germany and Italy on June 14, 1941 and then froze Japanese assets on July 
26, 1941 in the US territories.
8
 On August 14th, 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill announced the 
Atlantic Charter, the document containing the passages declaring the cooperation between the 
United States and Great Britain in which Roosevelt and Churchill signed. As a result, Roosevelt 
led the United States away from isolationism even further. The action, as one would expect, was 
not well-received as the president himself became subjected to numerous criticisms from his 
political opponents as well as the already skeptical public. 
The making of the Atlantic Charter itself involved many conflicting opinions regarding 
each nation‟s interests. Even though, it signified the cooperation between the United States and 
Great Britain along with other allied nations, the document contained their mutual principles and 
the agreements on the post war situations. The principles were no territorial gains were to be 
sought any Allied members; all people had a right to self-determination; getting rid of trade 
barriers and advocating for freedom of the seas, making way for a global economy; aggressor 
nations were to be disarmed and remained so afterwards. The document went through many 
revisions until the final document was issued on August 14, 1941. 
                                               
7
 Burns, Roosevelt, The Soldier of Freedom, p. 26, Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-1943, p. 74 
8
 Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, p. 121  
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As far as the public were concerned, this level of American involvement in the war was 
about the limit. The United States, through Roosevelt, was supplying another nation fighting 
their own war
9
 and was hindering the economy of their enemies. As an isolationist nation, these 
actions were way over the line but in order to end the conflict before it was too late, Roosevelt 
felt they must move on. In addition to hindering Japan‟s finance, the president also placed an oil 
embargo on them despite his advisors‟ protest.10 Japan was constantly short on resources which 
was the very reason why they invaded China along with the Indochina regions in the first place. 
Their assets being frozen in the United States along with the American presence in the West 
Pacific region directly threatened their survival. The United States was freed from its position of 
ambiguity by the bombing of Pearl Harbor by Imperial Japan on December 7th, 1941. 
The bombing of Pearl Harbor was meant to discourage the American presence in 
Southeast Asia but it had the opposite effect because that brought to light the notion that they 
were capable of attacking the United States to the public. The American people thought that the 
span of an ocean on each side would have provided sufficient natural protection from the war so 
that they would be able to work on fixing their economy peacefully. The American public was 
devastated and shocked by the loss at the naval base in Pearl Harbor. It did not take long for their 
collective grief to turn into rage, uniting the entire nation against the aggressor.
11
 The public 
opinion demanded that Japan pays for her crime. Earlier in the year, Nazi Germany also betrayed 
Stalin by launching operation Barbarossa invading Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941 despite the 
non-aggression pact they signed. The United States and the Soviet Union joined the ranks of 
Great Britain in the Second World War in this fashion. 
                                               
9
 Larrabee, Roosevelt, Commander in Chief,  p. 82 
10
 Ibid.,  p. 91-92 
11
 McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia,1941-46, p. 5 
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Despite what the United States Government claimed, Japan‟s attack on Pearl Harbor was 
not unprovoked. Roosevelt expected the attack to happen and intended to not prevent it.
12
 While 
declaring the United States neutral, Roosevelt had been actively supplying enemies of Germany. 
When Stalin and Hitler became enemies after operation Barbarossa, Roosevelt began supplying 
Stalin whom only a month earlier was his enemy.
13
 Hitler also realized that to be the case but he 
deemed those actions as mere annoyances and not real threats. As Roosevelt learned through the 
decoder “Magic” that Germany assured Japan that it would go to war with the United States if 
Japan “became engaged in war with the United States...”14 Roosevelt then turned to apply some 
pressure on Japan by not only froze their assets in the United States but also imposed an oil 
embargo on Japan.
15
 
By necessity, Japan took the bait as a chance of survival.
16
 On December 8, 1941, the 
Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7; the United States declared war on Japan with 
Roosevelt giving his “Day of Infamy” speech to the public. Initially, there was an issue that the 
United States were at war with only Japan but not the Axis. Therefore, the United States still was 
not able to engage in war with Nazi Germany but Hitler fixed it before it actually became an 
issue. By the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, whether or the United States wanted to join the 
war was not up for the question anymore, Hitler already saw American equipment on the fields, 
confirming their wish to enter the conflict. Additionally, Hitler believed that by helping Japan 
defeat the United States quickly the Japanese would, in return, help Germany beat Stalin in a 
pincer attack from his flank and through China. 
                                               
12
 Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-1943, p. 334 
13
 Ibid., p. 218-219 
14
 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History, p. 440 
15
 Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, p. 121  
16
 Fleming, The New Dealers’ War, p. 47-48 
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With all considered, Hitler and Mussolini declared war on the United States.
17
 Roosevelt 
then sent a telegram to Churchill on December 8, 1941 informing him that they were all “in the 
same boat,” which the prime minister replied the day after.18 The help that the United States was 
providing Great Britain and the Soviet Union no longer needed to be indirect or subtle because 
the unprovoked attack on the Hawaiian naval base provided just enough justification to bypass 
the Neutrality act and be directly involved in war without further angering the public. Not long 
after receiving words from Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, arrived December 22, 1941, to 
Washington for the First Washington Conference to discuss their joint plans. 
Unlike the two leaders who were in contact for a two years prior to their meeting, it took 
a while for the British Chiefs of Staffs (the BCOS) and the American Chiefs of Staffs (the JCS) 
to warm up to one another. Aside from fundamental differences within their chains of command 
and negative attitudes for one another, the war aims for both sides were quite different and, 
worse yet, they conflicted. The United States had a special disdain for imperialism and their 
global influence and Great Britain aimed to maintain its empire. The two party had a minor clash 
when they were discussing the Pacific theatre as the United States could not have cared any less 
if Great Britain lost Malaya, Burma or India, their aim was to build up a position strong enough 
to push Japan back to their isles. 
Another issue within the United States was that Roosevelt lacked the experience of 
working with his military personnel because he spent his entire presidency leading up to that 
moment addressing domestic policies not at all related to the military. Unlike the Churchill, who, 
combined with his patronizing personality, was very much involved in all levels of planning with 
                                               
17
 Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-1943, p. 352 
18
 Churchill, The Second World War III: The Grand Alliance, p. 608-609, Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-
1943, p. 340 
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his chiefs, Roosevelt was the type who focuses on the bigger picture and let his subordinates 
work out the details, limiting his connection with them on multiple levels.
19
 
The lack of connection also instilled doubts among his staffs. The American Chief of 
Staff George C. Marshall was worried about the president being too influenced by a seasoned 
politician such as Churchill and Roosevelt, as a result of that distrust, believed that Marshall 
simply had no faith in his judgment when they came to a disagreement. The two was not able to 
fully appreciate one another‟s points of view led to the two thinking very differently over time. 
Roosevelt resembled Churchill because their mutual political awareness while Marshall was 
thinking in terms of effective strategies. As Marshall was assuming that Roosevelt was simply 
following Churchill‟s advices and not his while Roosevelt was bothered by Marshall‟s lack of 
faith in him, their differences grew. 
Though never agreeing with one another, the two, nevertheless, had mutual respect for 
one another. They complimented each other well as they were both experts of what they do, they 
played their role well. After all, they managed to appeal to the public and win a war at the same 
time. That, however, was the end result of the Second World War. As of 1941, the mutual 
distrust between Marshall and Roosevelt as well as their lack of connection led them to agree on 
broad principles but mostly disagreed on the specifics in 1942. However, for the Allied effort in 
the Pacific in 1941, no specifics were discussed; therefore the disaster was caused purely by the 
lack of the specifics being discussed between the United States and Great Britain. 
Prior to his arrival for the First Washington Conference, Churchill sent three messages 
from the Duke of York containing three main ideas to be discussed in the conference. First, the 
matter concerned with the occupation of North African and Middle Eastern regions from Dakar 
                                               
19
 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History, p. 446 
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to Turkey possibly with the help of de Gaulle and the Free French.
20
 Second, idea concerned 
with the control over Southeast Asia and the third was the “Europe First” Strategy.21 The tactic 
to test the United States to choose their priority gave Churchill a desirable result because on the 
contrary to the general public, Roosevelt as well as Marshall recognized Hitler to be the main 
problem. Churchill was then relieved that at least, Roosevelt and his chiefs of staff can be 
reasoned with. As a result, the two parties shared the same views that the main problem stemmed 
from Nazi Germany and thus, they decided that the continental invasion of Europe would be the 
ultimate goal of the Allies without much of a discussion. However, nothing consolidated or 
permanent came out of this conference.
22
 
As it turned out, the Allies only came up with a broad objective which was to somehow 
focus on the European continent to defeat Hitler but did not plan for any actual operation. As the 
situation in the Pacific became dire, the Allies suddenly forgot that Europe was their joint 
priority. Since no details were agreed upon, Marshall and Roosevelt did not really have any 
problem agreeing with one another. The problem stemmed from the lack of cooperation between 
the United States and Great Britain. They operated separately despite the established joint 
command in the Pacific holding on to their own priorities. 
After issuing the Atlantic Charter, the Joint Chiefs of Staffs moved on to discuss the 
methods in which the armies would be commanded as a single unit, a unified command. During 
ARCADIA, Marshall came up with ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian Command) 
which gave complete command to one man: General Sir Archibald Wavell. Marshall based the 
idea of ABDA command on the similar strategy from the First World War which the French, 
British and American was commanded by Marshal Ferdinand Foch of France. The command line 
                                               
20
 Churchill, The Second World War II: Their Finest Hours, p. 476 
21
 Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. I,  p. 298 - 309 
22
 Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-1943, p. 386 
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was successful but Foch himself did not actually exert as much authority over armies of different 
nations which were the problem which became painfully relevant in the near future. Despite that, 
at the moment of the proposal, ABDA seemed promising to the American Chiefs of Staff, even 
Secretary of War. Stimson was on board with the idea. Marshall then went to try to sell the plans 
to the British team.
23
 
Some argument ensued between Marshall and Churchill but the latter conceded and 
ordered his war cabinet to cooperate with Marshall regarding the matter and also personally 
informed Wavell of his new task. After the unified military command under one commander was 
established, the direct command line from administrative personnel to military formed quite 
easily. In fact, Roosevelt spearheaded this idea himself. The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) 
was then created to allow both the BCOS and JCS to command troops as a single unit but the 
problem was that the area of operations would be in the European theatre, the idea of the troops 
sending messages to both sides simultaneously could have easily been influenced solely by the 
BCOS
24
 without the JCS
25
 being involved. The new proposal by the president was for the theatre 
commander report directly to Washington and from there, the report would be directed to the 
BCOS stationed in London. The situation then would be in reverse, in this scenario, the United 
States would be the one directing the situation. Despite the disagreement, the British and their 
prime minister ended up accepting the changes. Churchill had accepted at this point that Great 
Britain was no longer alone and compromises must be made if the units were to move as one. He 
then moved on to the final issue of the ARCADIA conference, the main reason to get United 
States involved: supplies and its distribution.
26
 
                                               
23
 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History,, p. 455-458 
24
 British Chiefs of Staffs 
25
 American Chiefs of Staffs 
26
 Ibid., p. 469 
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The ARCADIA conference ended in this manner. Despite the British Army Chief of Staff 
Sir Alan Brooke‟s protest, ABDA was created.27 Wavell helplessly accepted his new position of 
the new supreme commander of ABDA apparently in charge of fixing the situations not in 
Europe but rather the vast expanse of Southwest Pacific region. So began a new short episode of 
the Second World War, the utter failure of ABDA as both the Americans and the British attended 
to their own priorities while neither side even tried to cooperate with the other.
28
 
In the end, the Allied defeat in the Pacific theatre was due partly to, as it must be 
credited, the cold efficiency of the Japanese troops but for the most part it was simply due to the 
ineffectiveness of ABDA to facilitate an actual cooperative environment and the apparent 
differences in national interests among the Allies. The failures in the Pacific were due to the 
apparent conflict in national interests between Great Britain in Singapore and of the United 
States in the Philippines. The conflict in the interests alone would not have been so disastrous 
had the situation in the Pacific not been so dire that the Allies were forced to take some actions 
before they were able to work out the details among themselves regarding their top priority in the 
Pacific. As a result, the combined chiefs of staff shifted their attention away from the Far East 
theatre and discuss what the shared priority should be.
29
 
Late March, 1942, Marshall, who had to confront the two heads of state along with the 
entirety of the combined chiefs of staff regarding the matter, felt very much unprepared for the 
upcoming meeting because despite his disagreeing with the details of the strategy, he was still 
responsible for its overarching idea. However, one thing was certain; Marshall only had Europe 
in his mind as a priority from the very beginning.
30
 With renewed conviction, Marshall seized 
                                               
27
 Roberts, Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945, p. 81 
28
 Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-1943, p. 412 
29
 Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. I,  p. 409-411 
30
 Larrabee, Roosevelt, Commander in Chief,  p. 135 
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the opportunity to use the failures in the Pacific to bring up the Europe First policy which 
seemed to be forgotten by every party that agreed upon it.
31
 
While Marshall did not have much to say Southeast Asia, he did intend to bring up the 
prospect of the cross-channel invasion being the end goal of the war and therefore, the priority in 
which he had been advocating for from the very beginning. Marshall‟s basic strategy was to set 
the cross channel invasion to be the end goal which should have begun early due to the difficulty 
in logistics, not allowing the wholesale transportation of the troops, the problem that had been 
extremely relevant throughout every decisive battle.
32
 He then assigned Lieutenant General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower to work out the details towards that goal. Eisenhower then responded 
with a question for the entire chiefs of staffs to answer. He wanted the chiefs of staffs to 
collectively decide which theatre to give priority to, Pacific or Europe as at this stage, Marshall, 
along with the personnel from the War Department had reduced the level of priorities regarding 
Middle East and Africa from mandatory to highly desirable.
33
 
The first step towards bringing the matter up in the Allied meeting was to make sure his 
own team was on the same page. The first proposal was to be made to the president himself.  As 
mentioned earlier, Marshall and Roosevelt tended to agree on the principles but disagree on the 
details. Marshall had the right idea of focusing on Europe but his proposal of BOLERO
34
 being a 
priority did not resonate with Roosevelt. The president was more interested by GYMNAST.
35
 At 
one occasion, Marshall strongly stated to Roosevelt that if BOLERO were not to be given full 
attention, the operation would have been better off not considered at all. Realizing GYMNAST 
would come up later, for the moment the president relented and let Marshall work out the details. 
                                               
31
 Eisenhower, Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day, p. 62 
32
 Roberts, Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945, p. 129-130 
33
 Beitzell, The Uneasy Alliance, p. 33 
34
 Code name of the United States military troop buildup in Great Britain to set up for the cross-channel operation 
35
 Code name of the North African operation 
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April 4, 1942, Marshall and Hopkins left Washington for London to sell Churchill the plan for 
the cross-channel invasion.
36
 
In 1942, the view of the Americans and the British regarding the cross-channel operation 
differed greatly. The Americans was more optimistic about fighting the Germans. They believed 
the cross-channel operation would be the most direct way to end the war and no matter what the 
difficulty might have been, they could be overcome. And by that logic, with Russia‟s survival at 
stake, an emergency version of the cross-channel invasion can be arranged to make sure Russia 
survived Hitler‟s attacks. Marshall argued that the emergency cross-channel invasion would have 
forced Hitler to halt his offensive on Russia in order to defend the occupied France from the 
Allies. The argument was, however, later agreed upon in principle but ultimately shut down. The 
British disagreed. Churchill and British Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke thought that the cross-
channel invasion should be the final stage of war and not a diversion. Their many defeats at the 
hands of Germany were sobering reminders of their efficiency. 
Long before the United States joined the conflict. Great Britain started fighting Nazi 
Germany as early as September 1, 1939. The British Army was there when France fell in 1940. 
For the British, if the combined might of Great Britain and France was not enough to stop Hitler 
on the ground, then the Allies would not be able to even be a distraction for Hitler at the cross-
channel where sizable German troops were already installed. The British also realized that the 
American also never had any experience bearing the brunt of war on their own soil. By that 
logic, the American Chiefs of Staffs would not have understood or appreciated the burden that 
the British had to bear during the Blitz. 
The counter argument for Marshall‟s proposal from the British was that the German 
troops were already present on French soil in a number significant enough to sabotage any kind 
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of landing without Hitler‟s forces in Russia even flinching, let alone turn around.  In addition to 
the realistic analysis, another reason Great Britain was not ready to bring the fight to Hitler was 
the psychological effects from their defeat by Germany. As of 1942 and even 1943, Great Britain 
was in no physical or psychological to fight Hitler directly even as a diversion. The force would 
simply be defeated, troops slaughtered or captured, ending in a complete waste of time, troops, 
funding and possibly more importantly, the already low morale.
37
  
Great Britain also had a more immediate concern which was to keep their empire intact. 
Having lost Singapore and Burma during the Pacific campaign, the British were losing their 
territories. Their next immediate concern was India, not only as an imperial interest but also as a 
strategic position vital to the future of the Allies.
38
 Had India fell to Japan, the British argued, 
and then Japan and Germany would have been able to assist one another directly. Had Russia 
fell, the future of the Allies would have looked bleak at best because the Allies would lose the 
biggest combat troops to hold back Germany. Their vast expanse of land, containing an 
abundance of natural resources, would fall right into the enemy's‟ hands. With India and Russia 
in possession, Germany and Japan would be able to distribute the newly obtained resources 
which would have taken away the one of the few advantages the Allies, with the supplies from 
the United States, actually had.
39
 Churchill, agreed on principle of the idea of the cross-channel 
invasion because he did agree with its eventual execution but nothing specific was promised. 
Marshall and Hopkins also did not pursue it further.
40
 
Adding to the confusion was Roosevelt‟s attitude towards British influence over India. 
An average American disliked the idea of imperialism, especially when the British was involved, 
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the president himself on personal level, was no exception. Especially, as the supposed leader of 
the democratic world, Roosevelt could not and personally would not support or even condone the 
practice of imperialism. It also would have somewhat jeopardized his position in this war against 
tyranny because imperialism was, after all, one of the original form of tyranny.
41
 Roosevelt 
argued for the right to self-determination of the Indian people living on their own soil as a way to 
appeal, not so much to the public, but his political opponents who could have regarded his 
inaction as mere ignorance or worse yet, a support for imperialism. 
Churchill expressed that imperialism was a concept in which the Americans knew little 
about yet have strong opinions on.
42
 He argued that it was of little relevance, what he personally 
felt about the practice, India was undeniably a British responsibility and to make sudden changes 
during the time of war was not wise. The political situation in India was complicated as the 
people are divided and the biggest groups were the Hindu population who were more or less in 
power and favored self-determination and the Muslim population was another group who only 
had the somewhat equal status due to the British rule. Despite Churchill‟s attitude, India 
launched her own anti-British movement called quit India the very same day Churchill sent his 
reply to Roosevelt on April 12, 1942.
43
  
Despite the lengthy exchanges, the Allied priorities still had not been established, 1942 
came to be the year when the United States and Great Britain tried in multiple occasions to get 
the other side to agree to their point of view which even among themselves are obscure. After the 
meeting in London in early April, 1942, the situation was as follows: the general British attitude 
regarded SLEDGEHAMMER
44
 as suicidal.
45
 The American War Department led by Marshall 
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was headstrong about cross-channel invasion and was not open to any other idea that would not 
directly contribute to the cross-channel invasion.
46
 The president had a scheme of his own. 
Roosevelt also aimed for the second front like Marshal but was leaning towards North Africa 
like Churchill and the American public call for some kind of action for the American forces. His 
later scheme aimed to satisfy all three criteria by utilizing both Marshall‟s enthusiasm for the 
potential of ROUNDUP
47
 or SLEDGEHAMMER and the British‟s inability and unwillingness to 
facilitate such mission. 
As the debates continued, what had to be done were not and could not have been slowed 
down because time was of the essence. The Lend Lease Act was in full effect but the difficulties 
regarding logistics whether it was the limited capability for transportation, the natural hazards or 
the supply destruction by the enemies, had always been present. As a result, only small portions 
of supplies actually reached their destinations. In order to properly fulfill its role as the Allied 
arsenal, the United States must start delivering them early, often and in large quantities but even 
then it proved to be inadequate. The United States agreed to send supplies to Russia through 
Murmansk, the Northern Norwegian region. The pathway would include a disembark from 
United States across the Atlantic to make a stop in Scotland then circle around through Arctic 
ocean to Murmansk.
48
 
Churchill argued that the amount of supply exceeded the amount that the Murmansk port 
and his own sea transportation capacities could have handled. As a result, Churchill had to 
unload some supplies before sending the convoys to the Arctic. The action greatly concerned 
both Roosevelt and Stalin. Churchill then wanted to renegotiate the promised amount of supplies 
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with Roosevelt to he would not have to do what he had to. Roosevelt feared that by lowering the 
supply heading to Russia, Stalin would have had negative feelings toward their relationship. 
Therefore, the president made no changes and expected Churchill to fix it on his end. The 
president also warned Churchill about the consequences the off-loading actions would have had 
on the Russians and the future of the Alliance.
49
 
By doing exactly what he promised Stalin, he pushed all the responsibility on Churchill. 
Therefore, when Stalin did not receive what they asked for, the blame was completely placed on 
Churchill. In this case, Churchill was not even the one being at fault as his ships really were not 
able to carry the supplies; he simply had to do it because Roosevelt refused to risk upsetting 
Stalin. This was not to be the only time; the United States went out of their way to point out that 
some mistakes were entirely due to the British actions not the Allies. While the first few months 
of shipping were quite effective, Hitler finally caught on around March of 1942. Regardless of 
the predecessor of the supposed operation JUPITER
50
 not being as successful as Churchill 
imagined it to be, which proved Brooke to be right, the idea still lingered in his mind.
51
 They 
then shifted their attention back to finding the next actions for the Allied efforts which would 
either be the cross-channel invasion or the invasion of French occupied North Africa and the 
Middle East. 
One of the alternatives aside from mainland France was that of the Caribbean and the 
North African regions. The Allied leaders recognized the importance of the strategic point of the 
archipelago of Malta which was a British territory located between Sicily, Tunis, Gibraltar and 
Alexandria. Malta was another garrison in Churchill‟s mind that would have been able to stop 
the Axis. The invasion of Africa would have defeated the notorious German General Erwin 
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Rommel from getting supplies from Italy and once Rommel was defeated, gaining a foothold in 
North Africa would provide an excellent supply line as well as air power for the counteroffensive 
on Sicily and Italy or as Churchill would call it “the soft underbelly of the Axis” later on. The 
African operation was becoming more and more of a reality than its previous state which was 
pretty much to be postponed indefinitely.
52
 
Though the president had given much attention to the development regarding Africa, he 
could not have denied the fact that average Americans could not have cared any less. The United 
States, they felt, still had a major score to settle with Japan. This was especially true for the 
inhabitants of the American West Coast who were understandably scared by the possibility of an 
invasion. The defeats of the American forces in the Philippines did not help the matter in the 
slightest. Their request for the reinforcement gave Marshall, who personally disliked readjusting 
troops he already allocated, quite a headache for he could have done nothing else but to pull 
some ships from the fleet he assembled for BOLERO and send them over.
53
 
This episode actually did not last long as Japan, once again, made the situation less 
complicated for the Americans. Their great fleet returned to engage the Americans in the Battle 
of Midway for the purpose of claiming the outpost on the Midway Island. Despite having the 
smaller fleet, the Americans utilized some unconventional strategies which turned out to be 
effective. Japanese forces suffered little but the exchange did not prove fruitful. Therefore, 
despite relatively small casualties, Japan retreated. The successful defense greatly relieved the 
inhabitants of the Coast areas allowing Marshall to seize the opportunity to pull back his ships to 
where they were meant to be.
54
 The success of the Battle of Midway also raised convinced the 
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United States that Japanese expansion not only reached its limits but this was already beyond 
their capacity, allowing Roosevelt and his war cabinet to focus on Europe.
55
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Chapter II: Cutthroat 
To recapitulate, our current development took us to the period of time right after the 
Battle of Midway on June 3, 1942 which was the invasion of the Midway Island by the Japanese 
fleet to remove the United States as a threat. American Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall was 
still adamant, even after failing to succeed in 1942, on his position to build up forces in the 
British Isles for his plan of the cross-channel invasion in 1943. His subordinate Lieutenant 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower was sent to supervise the Allied operation over in London since 
June 23, 1942. Marshall was well aware that an emergency cross-channel invasion was 
dangerous but he preferred the Allies to only focus on BOLERO
56
 for fear that Churchill might 
divert the attention of the Allies enough that the invasion of Northern France be indefinitely 
postponed or ultimately canceled.
57
 While Marshall, Eisenhower and the JCS
58
 were optimistic 
about the potential success of the operation, the British had the opposite attitude. 
Having fought against the formidable German troops since the time of the First World 
War, the British were much more aware of their might.
59
 Neither Brooke nor Churchill was 
convinced that Marshall‟s operation could have succeeded. Despite the pressure from Russia for 
the Allies to create a diversion on the second front, Churchill as well as the British chiefs of staff 
(BCOS) was certain that the Allies would not have been able to facilitate the operation in 1942 
because there was no way to build up forces significant enough to even give the Germans a 
nudge in that small period of time. The British was not at all against operation BOLERO but they 
did have problems with operation SLEDGEHAMMER.
60
 They also realize that, eventually, they 
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would have to cross that channel but they were looking for something more of a solid version of 
operation ROUNDUP, not a suicide mission like SLEDGEHAMMER. 
Churchill had constantly and subtly been proposing that the Allies change focus to 
establishing a position in French-occupied North Africa to open up the second front through Italy 
instead of mainland France while think of another way to support Russia for the mean time. 
While realized the importance of BOLERO, Roosevelt shared the interest in operating in North 
Africa with Churchill because it allowed for an early opportunity for the American troops to be 
in battle
61
 to appeal to the American public who wanted their troops to be in combat.
62
 After the 
Battle of Midway, the United States managed to prevent the Japanese from advancing on their 
position, allowing them to return their focus to the Atlantic theatre.
63
 
The Japanese attacked Midway; the opinion in terms of the future Allied effort became 
truly divided especially among the Americans. Among the American military, many high 
ranking officers such as Admiral Ernest King were more interested in the Pacific. At this stage, 
only Marshall was actually focusing on building up forces for the cross-channel invasion in the 
future, the appeal in which became less and less popular over time. The British were not able to 
pay attention to either of them and stood firm on their opinion. Churchill, as well as Roosevelt, 
who was also quite eager for action, was fixated on the future of North Africa and the Middle 
East.
64
 
North Africa, much like any other Allied plans, was riddled with complications. Aside 
from the German and Italian presence in the Region obtained not too long prior to the Second 
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World War, the majority of Northern African continent was occupied by the supposedly fallen 
French. While the French was defeated by Germany and a puppet government, the Vichy French, 
was installed under Hitler‟s command to govern France, the French still had some degree of 
independence in their territories North Africa. The Vichy French controlled the regions from 
Morocco, Algeria to Tunis. Despite their surrender to Hitler, there were still some elements of 
resistance among the French ranks such as Charles de Gaulle of the Free French, who was based 
in the UK after the fall of France. Among the Vichy forces in Africa, the likes of General Henri 
Giraud and Admiral Francois Darlan with his naval fleet shared their hatred for Hitler‟s regime. 
Despite their pledge not to take up arms against Hitler, the disdain for Hitler‟s rule among these 
French commanders had the potential of being highly beneficial to the Allied cause. 
The most obvious problem regarding French cooperation with the Allies was their 
grudges for the British due partly to their eternal rivalries, but more importantly to their latest 
squabbles. Not long after the French surrendered to Germany, the British Navy scuttled a great 
number of French fleet, to prevent future uses of that fleet by the Germans during operation 
CATAPULT on July 3, 1940.
65
 Adding to the mix, the British just took control of Madagascar, 
the area previously under French control in May 1942, the incident which added even more 
animosity. Additionally, another problem regarding the French was also their own personal 
political ambitions, further complicating the situation.
66
 
While the African and France question remained unanswered, Russia made her move, 
reaching out to Great Britain and the United States directly. Stalin planned to dispatch his 
Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, to negotiate new policies for opening up a second front 
on Hitler to ease off the pressure on Russia. Stalin felt that, while the Soviets were fortunate 
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enough to survive a winter against the Fuhrer through the desperate Scorched Earth policy, they 
would not survive a summer German offensive unless their western allies did something. 
Another objective was to gain recognition for their newly acquired three Baltic states, namely 
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Stalin knew how Roosevelt felt about territorial expansion while 
the British would be more accepting and this knowledge could be instrumental to the success of 
the negotiation. 
Before Molotov departed, Roosevelt wanted to establish some kind of a relationship or at 
least an influence on Stalin before he negotiates with the British. Roosevelt had no intention of 
acknowledging the future occupation of the Balkans by the Russians. Roosevelt was aware that 
Churchill planned to sign a separate twenty year long treaty which will include the passages 
regarding the Baltic States with the Russians and he wanted to stop that from happening.
67
 
However, he lost to Churchill‟s initiative and Stalin‟s scheme. Not only did, the prime minister‟s 
word reach Stalin first, Stalin also had some alternate schemes of his own and it involved starting 
the tour in London. Wasting no time, Molotov took off right away to Great Britain to conduct the 
negotiations arriving in London on May 20, 1942. 
Upon Molotov‟s landing in London, Hitler‟s advance on the Russian Front had worsened. 
Since May 17, 1942, Soviet troops began to lose their position to the panzers troops in the 
Second Battle of Kharkov.  The situation put the prospect of the second front automatically on 
the top priority list for Stalin. Stalin then planned to use the recognition of the Baltic territories
68
 
as a tool for this negotiation. Stalin realized that the United States would object out right while 
Britain would be willing to negotiate the matter in exchange for help from Russia. 
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Also realizing that no matter how lenient the British was likely going to be on the 
territorial expansion, they could not have accepted the Soviet control of new territories if Poland 
was included as it would utterly destroy any air of legitimacy of their war position.
69
 The Soviet 
came with two requests from the Allies, if none can be answered, the future of their Alliance 
could have been in jeopardy. Therefore, invoking Poland would have forced the British to refuse 
the request for recognition meaning that they in some sense owed it to Russia as a an ally to 
provide something for Russia to work with. Stalin had hoped that the British would do something 
about the second front, but if Churchill failed to fulfill this obligation, Russia would at least gain 
an edge in future dealings of the Allies. To strengthen his argument, Molotov then emphasized 
the importance of Russia‟s survival even further by stating the facts already obvious to the 
British.
70
 
In addition to the mention of the Curzon line in Poland, Molotov also painted a dramatic 
picture of the state the allies would be in, had the Soviet Union fall. Despite his strong view, 
shared by the entirety of British staffs, against any cross-channel invasion, Churchill did promise 
Molotov that he would arrange something to help Stalin when Molotov stops by London before 
flying back to Russia. Molotov had, more or less, succeeded in the plea of help all the while 
establishing the position for Russia as a party that did not receive the help it deserves despite 
being the only one actually suffering in the millions in terms of life loss, holding the line against 
Nazi Germany. This knowledge, Stalin believed, would provide at least some psychological 
advantages in their future negotiations with the Allies. Having negotiated somewhat 
successfully, with Great Britain, Molotov departed for the United States on May 29, 1942.
71
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As Molotov then left London for Washington, Churchill cabled Roosevelt to inform that 
while he did not make any tangible promise to Molotov, he did promise some kind of response to 
the Russian requests. While relaying the message, Churchill expressed apparent interest in 
bringing back GYMNAST,
72
 signaling his lack of enthusiasm for SLEDGEHAMMER as a 
divergent plan, the knowledge in which Roosevelt exploited soon after. Upon learning that no 
postwar treaty was signed, Roosevelt was relieved. 
To Roosevelt, the summary of the current situation was that the British did not make any 
real promise to the Russians, no concrete relationship between Russia and Great Britain was 
established and Churchill was still not in the position to allow for a cross-channel invasion. 
These are the materials that Roosevelt intended to use for his future dealings with the Allies. 
Molotov knew that mentioning the territories to the Americans was to be avoided at all cost so he 
only intended to discuss the second front with the Allies. For the sake of future relationship, 
Roosevelt omitted mentioning what Molotov was actively avoiding to hear. However, he did 
mention his idea of post war peace organization which would be controlled by the United States, 
the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China, introducing the United Nations to Stalin, 
which was well received by the Red Tsar.
73
  
Molotov once again proceeded to use the postwar picture for persuasion but it proved to 
be unnecessary. Roosevelt knew that the British would not have supported operation 
ROUNDUP
74, much less, SLEDGEHAMMER and Marshall‟s enthusiasm would never have let 
the opportunity to bring up the operation to the otherwise unenthusiastic president pass. The 
president recognized the importance of BOLERO but it was not his priority. What he cared about 
was BOLERO but not SLEDGEHAMMER. He was more interested in GYMNAST and he 
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realized knew Churchill also did. Therefore, Roosevelt stated that the Western Allies expected 
the second front that year.
75
 He then allowed Marshall and Molotov discuss the details of the 
eventual plan while being assured that Churchill, once again, would bring GYMNAST back into 
the picture. 
The discussion between Molotov and the American staffs consequently was largely the 
details of the Lend-Lease arrangement which involves a few concerns about the logistics. These 
concerns consisted of the actual concern for their ability to transport the supplies to Russia and 
the other was the British demands for the supplies. However, when it came to Molotov, 
Roosevelt placed emphasis the fact that the British was not willing to go with the cross-channel 
operation in 1942. Without considering the true intention, Roosevelt, in effect, was blaming 
Churchill for the Allies not being able to help Stalin, and thus created a sense of distrust between 
them.
76
 
Roosevelt not expressing any issue from the American point of view on cross-channel, 
essentially forced Churchill to be the one having to let Russia know that it was they alone who 
had a problem with the cross-channel invasion. The blame would have been largely on Great 
Britain in the eye of the Russians and by default. This would also force Churchill to bring up 
GYMNAST, as the alternate plan, to the Allies so that Roosevelt would not have to personally 
override Marshall when the time comes. To apply even more pressure on Britain and establish a 
good impression on Russia, the president, who never fully supported BOLERO, told Molotov 
that the United States was 1) expecting to establish a second front, 2) would provide more 
supplies to Russia despite the British protest and lastly, against Marshall‟s advice, 3) moved the 
timing of ROUNDUP up to August 1942, just two months away from the time, Molotov was 
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there.
77
 Churchill, as expected, panicked and was forced to tell the Russians that Great Britain 
could not promise anything.
78
 
Churchill, as the one who told the president to not forget about GYMNAST, was 
spellbound by the front that the president, who apparently was advocating for operation 
SLEDGEHAMMER to be in full swing, put up. To him, the president needed convincing to be 
able to recognize the importance of GYMNAST. The prime minister was even more convinced 
of the by Roosevelt‟s commitment to the cross-channel operation after he sent Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, British Chief of Combined Operations, to the United States discussing the details 
on it, possibly as a pretense. 
The true intention was most likely to see the details and the scale of production in order 
to gauge what the president was actually planning to do. The Americans were accelerating their 
production of landing crafts, which would be instrumental for the beach landings which 
contributed to convincing Churchill. It turned out that, despite the accelerated production 
actually for the eventual amphibious operation, Roosevelt never let the prospect of GYMNAST 
escape his mind. Though unbeknownst to the British, the entirety of the American staffs was 
well-aware of their president‟s apparent interest in North Africa and even they were convinced 
that the president came to acknowledge the importance of SLEDGEHAMMER. To Marshall, 
everything seemed to be in favor of the cross-channel operation until he realized he had been 
played by the president. Roosevelt brought up North Africa as a second front to Marshall and his 
staffs on June 17, 1942, the date in which Churchill, Brooke and Ismay left London to visit the 
United States.
79
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At this stage, the military staffs on both sides were equally concerned about the special 
love for sideshows, their leaders apparently shared. Even Brooke at this point was more in favor 
of at least some aspects of SLEDGEHAMMER, which was the building up of forces to prepare 
for the eventual invasion. He would rather spend the effort building up the forces than making 
small and, to him, inconsequential actions just to distract Hitler or the public in either country. 
However, fate brought GYMNAST into the picture. During the meeting between the two nations 
on June 21, 1942, the British position in Tobruk, Libya, which previously were thought to be 
impregnable, had surrendered and 33,000 troops became war prisoners.
80
 Initially, General 
Arnold believed that the equipment were enough in the Middle East for Tobruk but the incident 
proved him wrong.
81
 After recovering the brief moment of shock, Roosevelt and even Marshall 
agreed to send supplies and tanks to assist the British troops right away which Churchill and 
Brooke, who witnessed too many defeats in the span of a few years, were genuinely thankful for 
even until the later years of war in 1945.
82
 
This entire event with the meeting with Molotov and the fall of Tobruk produced several 
positive results for Roosevelt. Firstly, due to the failure to recognize the Russian occupation of 
the Baltic States by the British, a certain level of distrust was created between Churchill and 
Stalin which would make the signing of any new treaties just between the two less likely. 
Secondly, elements of GYMNAST were brought back into the picture through a few mentions. 
Lastly, the generous deployment of troops to assist the British cause at Tobruk strengthened the 
relationship with Great Britain. The American public wanted action, the Russians wanted a 
second front, the British were not able to facilitate a cross-channel invasion and they would be 
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the ones to help Roosevelt convince Marshall to give in. Whether or not the turn of the events 
was Roosevelt‟s intention, it did manage to answer all of the criteria mentioned above for him. 
Throughout the rest of the day‟s meetings, event in Tobruk immediately shifted most of 
the attention of the entirety of the British staffs, regardless of their previous views, to North 
Africa and Middle East. GYMNAST was mentioned in words for the first time since the Atlantic 
Charter. Even Brooke and other military personnel who initially were reluctant to the plausibility 
of GYMNAST became convinced of its importance shortly after. Defeated and exhausted, 
Marshall was utterly defeated. Operation SLEDGEHAMMER was alive but on its very last 
dying breath.
83
 Arriving in London on June 23, Eisenhower, while aware that there were 
conflicting opinions among the higher ups regarding their war effort, he was not specifically 
given any new instructions. Therefore, other than establishing some general setting up, he largely 
stuck to SLEDGEHAMMER like Marshall instructed him to. Sincere and straightforward, 
General Eisenhower quickly became well-liked among the British Generals and the prime 
minister himself alike.
84
  
Following the defeat at Tobruk, the British Eighth Army was pushed back into Egypt 
back to El Alamein, their Mediterranean Fleet retreated to the Suez Canal, all the while, 
Germany‟s assault on Russia continued towards Volga and Caucasia. After a few skirmishes and 
major losses of convoys in the Atlantic, British troops managed to stabilize the situations in the 
Middle East by setting up their garrison behind the Qattara Depression which was ideal for 
defense as it narrowed the path of the attacking forces eliminating their advantage in number. 
The German assault also slowed down on its own as Rommel‟s troops were too deep into the 
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continent meaning that the supply lines were stretched far too thin to allow them to attack as 
efficiently.
85
 
As if the end of SLEDGEHAMMER was not obvious, within two weeks after the arrival 
of Eisenhower, Churchill remarked informally that Great Britain is no longer considering the 
cross-channel operation in 1942. Upon learning about it, Marshall, Stimson, along with Admiral 
Ernest King, stormed Roosevelt‟s office to discuss the matter on July 15 and the tensions were 
high. In addition to pretty much the same argument between Roosevelt and Marshall, this time 
the argument ended with the president‟s decision to, once again, send Hopkins, Marshall as well 
as King over to London to talk it out with Churchill himself. Marshall then departed the United 
States on July 16, 1942 in order to sell his unlikely plan one last time to the person least likely to 
buy it.
86
 
Despite his prime interest in the Pacific, King chose to support Marshall. While Marshall 
and King traveled to England to once again hard sell SLEDGEHAMMER, Hopkins went for an 
entirely different purpose. Hopkins, representing the president, pretty much went to the British 
know that Roosevelt agrees with GYMNAST. Arriving on the same day (July 18) King, 
Marshall and Eisenhower revised the plan to make it sound as appealing to the British as they 
can and later tried to no avail to convince the British of its plausibility. Churchill was also at the 
end of his wits as he did not disagree with BOLERO, he simply was against SLEDGEHAMMER 
because it would be costly and would fail completely. As Marshall cabled Roosevelt about the 
failure of the negotiation, he did not even sound disappointed as he already expected the 
outcome.
87
 With the shared objective decided, Churchill then worked on informing Stalin of the 
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changes in strategies as well as restructuring the commanding positions in the Middle East
88
 to 
prepare for TORCH
89
. 
Churchill did somehow secure permission from King George to fly on this dangerous trip 
to Russia. Churchill‟s perilous trip was then planned departing from London and under the 
shroud of night, hopping off of French occupied Gibraltar to Cairo, where he completely 
changed the command structure of the entire British forces, then with Stalin‟s approval, to 
Russia. General Harold Alexander assumed Auchinleck‟s position as the supreme commander of 
both North Africa and Middle East theatre. Lieutenant General Bernard Law Montgomery was 
summoned to Cairo to command the British First Army.
90
 
After the positions are organized, Churchill traveled, finally, to Moscow along with 
Averell Harriman who, like Hopkins, served directly under the President himself representing his 
will. Right after arrival on August 10, 1942, Churchill once again went right to the point 
informing Stalin, whom he met for the very first time, all the the very same reasons that defeated 
Marshal explaining why he was not able to support Russia with the cross-channel invasion along 
with explaining further why Churchill had to pulled some convoys heading for Russia for the 
Middle East. Churchill then tried to tell Stalin his plans of directly bombing Germany to get his 
attention and then, out of the blue, mentioned TORCH.
91
 The Red Tsar, as it turned out, took the 
news surprisingly well on the spot and continued to discuss the details of TORCH with 
Churchill. 
Unfortunately, Stalin‟s calm demeanor from earlier was simply a guise to buy time and 
extract information from Churchill. Apparently, Stalin, to the point of paranoia, never trusted and 
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never came to trust his Western Allies. Argument ensued and tensions were high but the two 
eventually reconciled in the evening. Churchill then left after the unpleasant episode in Russia 
having succeeded in establishing a relationship between the Western Allies and the Soviet 
Union, on August 15, 1942.
92
 
Back in Washington, both Stimson and especially Marshall was still not able to absorb 
the development leading up to TORCH. Marshall accepted his defeat for ROUNDUP and 
SLEDGEHAMMER but neglecting to at least build up forces for the future offensive in favor of 
the Middle East was not even remotely wise to him. He would rather not have any military action 
for the United States. Shattering his hope, Roosevelt, upon learning of Marshall‟s attitude, 
declared that TORCH would be carried out at the earliest date possible.
93
 
Eisenhower was assigned to execute TORCH and the first thing he did was to restructure 
his own chain of command to have an equal amount of commanding officers from both Great 
Britain and the United States. Eisenhower only had two exceptions in this adjustment: his deputy 
and his chief of staff had to be Americans. He picked Major General Mark W. Clark to be his 
deputy that would take over his role should something happen to him and Brigadier General 
Walter Bedell Smith from Department of War to be his chief of staff. On August 17, 1942, the 
arrangement came into effect. With chain of command established, the Allies had to decide the 
details for the landings of TORCH which had to be done as discreet as possible.
94
 
There were four potential beaches thought to be potential landing spots: Bone, Algiers, 
Oran and Casablanca. Due to the fact that the Allies did not have enough forces to manage all of 
the landings and the failure to secure more vessels from the Pacific Theatre did not allow for the 
execution of all landings. The Allies led by Eisenhower had to choose to at least not land on one 
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or two of them. Having yet to establish the authority he later would, Eisenhower only managed 
to provide his opinion on the matter as a basis for his Combined Chiefs to work on but not 
commanding it. With much discussion, the conclusion was that the combined forces were to 
somehow land on Casablanca, Oran and Algiers before Germany and Italy does.
95
 
Securing the French‟s support was also one of the most pressing concerns to the degree 
that even the TORCH landings had to be done with an all American troops to prevent the Anglo-
French animosity from complicating the situation. Roosevelt contacted the U.S. consul general, 
Robert D. Murphy to report to Washington in early September. Like Hopkins and Harriman, 
Murphy was one of the agents who reported directly to the president and his position was 
nothing short of a perfect cover for his real purpose. He was within the French ranks as early as 
December of 1940 and had been establishing connections with powerful figures, the likes of 
General Maxime Weygand, in France and North Africa ever since. Unfortunately, the removal of 
Weygand by the Nazis in November, 1941 essentially ended the progress Murphy had made and 
never recovered ever since.
96
 With TORCH at the horizon, if there was any time for Murphy to 
make a move within the Vichy ranks, this would be it. 
Adding to the confusion was the fact that the American public branded Vichy France as a 
collaborationist of Hitler and was against the idea of the Allies cooperating with them despite 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull‟s Vichy Policy. Even then, Murphy continued to strongly advised 
Roosevelt to not let the public interfere with working with Vichy France which the president 
then obliged. Upon meeting Roosevelt and Hopkins, Murphy proposed to let him make use of his 
North African contacts to assist in TORCH from within the French ranks. Despite Marshall‟s 
protest, Roosevelt accepted Murphy‟s plan with a condition that the operation be kept a secret 
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form Secretary Hull. Murphy‟s mission was to try his best to find a Vichy figure who would 
have supported the Allies and also would have been willing to step down after the ordeal was 
over in order to later make way for De Gaulle, representing the Free French, in to power for the 
eye of the public. Murphy, under the guise of Lieutenant Colonel McGowan
97
 to fool the Axis‟ 
intelligence departed for London to report to Eisenhower as a latest addition to operation 
TORCH. 
In London, while discussing TORCH with Eisenhower, Murphy brought up the point that 
potential French retaliation could be neutralized without fighting if Eisenhower let him establish 
those contacts. Though Eisenhower was skeptical, the two did come up with three potential 
candidates to lead the North African French which are General Henri Honore Giraud, Admiral 
Darlan and General Auguste Nogues, French Commander-in-Chief, Casablanca. The decisions 
eventually came down to only Darlan and Giraud as Nogues promised the Allies nothing but all 
out resistance.
98
 The decisions were made easier when Giraud can be reached easier through one 
of Murphy‟s contact, M. Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil.99 
Through the contact, Murphy and Clark was sent to Messelmoun, a beach near Algiers, 
on October 21 to negotiate with Giraud‟s contact, Major General Charles Mast, the French 
cooperation only in principle but not in details. Mast‟s suggestions for the strategies were largely 
in line with the Allies, except for an extra landing on Southern France which the Allies was not 
able to oblige. Giraud also requested that he was to have the title of the Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Force.
100
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While, Murphy and Clark was on their mission to Africa, Roosevelt and Churchill 
worked together on a draft to be sent to Petain and his government to inform them that the Allied 
presence in North Africa was not meant to threaten the Vichy government. The message 
contained some warnings of the danger that the Hitler, at his end of patience, would attack 
French controlled North Africa. The letter stated that while the Allies understood that France was 
not in the state to take up arms against Germany or Italy, the least they can do was to not resist 
the Allied landings. Thinking that Roosevelt was much too kind in his wordings, Churchill 
suggested that he left out all the unnecessary friendly remarks out of the message. The message 
was to be sent out much later.
101
 
It did not take long for Giraud to be impatient. On October 28, Murphy reported to 
Eisenhower that Giraud demanded that he be put in charge of TORCH within forty eight hours 
and troops also had to be sent to Southern France as well as TORCH be delayed from November 
7 to November 21. Though Murphy felt that the compromise was necessary, Roosevelt and 
Eisenhower have had enough and instructed Murphy to ignore the bluff and do the best he can to 
talk Giraud into cooperation because TORCH was already in motion as they spoke. November 5, 
1942, Eisenhower, Clark and the staffs departed London to Gibraltar. The pre-TORCH period, 
known to be one of the most frustrating periods throughout the war, then came to an end.
102
 The 
first event that kick started the turn of the tide for the Allies was the very first Allied victory at El 
Alamein by Lieutenant General Montgomery under the supervision of General Alexander of 
Great Britain. Though he was replacing Auchinleck, Montgomery as well as his commander 
acknowledged the brilliance of the original strategy Auchinleck came up with and stuck to it.
103
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As for Rommel, as of August 28,
104
 his troops were exhausted, low on supplies and he, 
himself was sick with several illness and barely was able to function, let alone command. 
However Hitler did not really give him much of an option but to press on.
105
 As expected, 
Rommel was driven back to his original line in Libya on September 7. Though the loss were not 
so different on either side, the fact that British held the line to the point of driving Rommel back 
counted as the first significant victory which greatly boosting the morale of the Allies. After 
several failed counter offensives and heavy losses, Montgomery eventually defeated Rommel 
forcing him to retreat to Tunisia on November 2, 1942.
106
 
The landings for TORCH proceeded shortly after and one of the only real problems the 
landing troops faced was the strong waves on the Moroccan shores preventing Patton‟s troops 
from landing. French resistance was comparatively less concerning. Despite the formidable 
number of troops the Vichy French possessed, their war gears were very much outdated. Since 
the occupation of France by Nazi Germany, Hitler never fully trusted the Vichy government and 
therefore only minimally allowed for their military presence against the Allies. In terms of war 
technologies, French tanks were simply outdated, their anti-air capabilities around Morocco were 
minimal at best and their air support was non-existent allowing full control of the sky for the 
Allies. 
The US Navy under the leadership of Major General Lucian Truscott managed to land in 
Morocco on November 10, 1942, and managed to capture an airfield shortly after. By the time 
that the troops claimed the airfield near Mehdia, the resistance in Algeria had been stopped by a 
ceasefire order and the landing met with resistance from Rommel‟s troops which remained 
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present yet inconsequential until April 1943.
107
 While the Algerian battle ended in a ceasefire 
and minimal casualties, the resistance would have been much fiercer, had some work not been 
done from the inside.
108
 
November 7, the French resistance groups, upon being given the signal by Murphy, 
staged a coup d‟état, disabling the French XIX Corps. With the troops neutralized, the landing 
immediately succeeded. However, to the Allies‟ surprise, Darlan also happened to be there to see 
his son, Alain, who was stricken with polio.
109
 Upon meeting with Murphy and Clark, Darlan 
issued a ceasefire on November 8. Darlan was more or less supportive of the Allied cause but 
was disappointed that the Allies picked Giraud over him. He was not wrong, Giraud proved to be 
the wrong choice as Darlan was still around, he was not well received at all among the Vichy 
ranks. This fact made the Allies arrangement of making him commander complicated but once 
again the turns of events simplified the answer. Admiral Francois Darlan was assassinated on a 
Thursday afternoon, Christmas Eve, 1942 allowing Giraud to somewhat lead the leaderless 
crowd.
110
 
As of November 19, 1942, with Egypt and Malta
111
 stabilized, Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunis came into the fold and Hitler‟s Battle of Stalingrad was also halted by the Red Army. As 
German troops being pushed back, Roosevelt and Churchill seized the opportunity to hit Hitler 
while morale is low. In early 1943, American and British air force began the Combined Bomber 
Offensive on Germany to destroy their economy as well as their morale by destroying their 
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civilian living spaces. Being stopped in both North Africa and Russia, November of 1942 
marked the beginning Hitler‟s downfall and death‟s shadow being casted upon Italy while the 
strategic of the Allies, for once, became solid enough to have a fighting chance against the Axis 
powers. Their next step for the Allies was to plan to press on the offensive on the continent. 
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Chapter III: Alpha Strike 
 From the beginning of the month of November, 1942 to the first half of January, 1943, 
with the exception of mainland France being occupied by Hitler, the Allies managed to turn the 
tide in their favor. Great Britain, having won the Second Battle of El Alamein, reestablished her 
position in Egypt on November 2 as well as recaptured Tobruk, Derna as well as Benghazi in 
Libya by the 20th. For the rest of November, the British devoted their troops to pursue the 
defeated Rommel into Tunisia. On the very last day of the year, the British won a major naval 
victory against Germany in the Battle of Barents Sea. The United States began operation 
TORCH, and the generals managed to land on the beachheads of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia 
on November 8 with minimal resistance at Oran, Tunisia which fell only within two days. The 
American troops at Oran then joined the British on their pursuit of Rommel who was continually 
pushed further and further into Tunisia finally defeating Rommel at the Battle for Longstop Hill 
on April 7, 1943. 
On the 12th, the United States battled Japan in the Battle of Guadalcanal and even though 
the losses were great, the United States turned Guadalcanal over to United States and reclaimed 
Buna, New Guinea on January 2, 1943. November 22, Soviet troops managed to completely 
surround German troops in the Battle of Stalingrad. On January 10, 1943, the Soviet Union 
began their counter offensive on Germany until the very last German troops commanded by 
Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, surrendered in Stalingrad on January 31, 1943. After his victory 
at Stalingrad, Stalin gained permanent advantage over Hitler. Therefore his main concerns were 
about his own Allies.
112
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Taking the advantage of Germany‟s dwindling momentum, Roosevelt as well as 
Churchill agreed to intensify the aerial bombings on Germany‟s and Italy‟s mainland and 
airfields to not only hinder enemy air power but also hurt their morale. The notable bombing 
efforts during the period between November, 1942 and January, 1943 were the US Air Force 
bombing of Naples, Italy in December and the Royal Air Force bombing of Berlin, Germany in 
January.  
The idea of a conference had been around ever since one of the first TORCH landings. 
On November 26, 1942 Roosevelt suggested the idea of a conference between the military 
personnel from the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union which Churchill disagreed. 
Churchill believed a conference without the agreement on a joint direction would achieve little, 
especially if the military meeting was to take place in Moscow. As a result, Roosevelt and 
Churchill planned for the Casablanca Conference in mid-January, 1943. During the period of 
continuous victories, the Allies called for a conference between the leaders of the Allies which 
aimed to include not only the Big Three but also the French who was instrumental to the success 
of TORCH. 
The holding of the conference was aimed towards discussing the next action for the 
Allies to take and what roles should each of them fulfill. On December 3, 1942, Churchill sent 
Stalin a telegram of the proposal for the joint conference just to receive a response containing his 
refusal on December 6. Stalin claimed that the military situation at Stalingrad was at the most 
critical stage and required his presence at all times,
113
 which was a valid statement, considering 
that Stalin really did command his own troops from his headquarters.
114
 Stalin also mentioned 
that the Western Allies should also open up the second front to help him. 
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Before sending his telegram to Stalin, Churchill proposed the idea of the meeting just 
between the United States and Great Britain before meeting the Big Three, which, to some 
degree, signified that he thought Stalin was to some degree separated from him and Roosevelt at 
least geographically. Churchill was thinking in the mindset of Western Allies being one entity 
and Soviet being another as they operated independently for the most part. Therefore, he wanted 
to make sure Great Britain and the United States was on the same page, or rather, for him to 
learn what Roosevelt was thinking before meeting the Russians. Roosevelt strongly opposed the 
idea because he was wary that Stalin would be suspicious if the two were to meet without him. 
The president tried his hardest not to upset the already paranoid Stalin over something 
unnecessary. After all, he had been trying to earn their trust for as long as they have been in 
contact sometimes at a cost of discrediting Churchill. 
Whenever Russia becomes involved, Roosevelt would be somewhat distant from 
Churchill to not cause an imbalance between the Allies. The ultimate Allied victory would 
largely depend on not only Russia‟s survival but also cooperation. Stalin was especially paranoid 
about his status among the Allies because, like Churchill, he also viewed that the Western Allies 
were a single entity and Russia was an outsider. To secure the future cohesion of the Allies, 
Roosevelt was willing to accommodate Stalin over Churchill to give Stalin the impression that he 
was not leaning towards Great Britain. Once Stalin informed Churchill that he was not able to 
attend the conference, Roosevelt and Churchill tried to plan a meeting around the fact that Stalin 
was not able to leave Moscow until March.
115
 Roosevelt, for some time, was even considering 
moving the meeting to March just for Stalin to be at a conference but ultimately gave up.
116
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After Churchill and Roosevelt picked Casablanca as their meeting spot, Eisenhower 
picked a hotel in Anfa, south of Casablanca, only a mile away from the Atlantic. President 
Roosevelt, Marshall, King and Lieutenant General Henry Arnold represented the United States. 
Churchill, General Sir Alan Brooke, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound and Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles R. Portal represented Great Britain. The conference was also joined by representatives of 
the Free French Charles De Gaulle as well as General Henri Giraud, the newly appointed Vichy 
French commander-in-chief.
117
 The final decisions were settled on December 29, 1942 and the 
conference took place there on January 14, 1943. 
Unlike Great Britain, who already had the invasion of Italy from North Africa in mind, 
the American representatives actually were quite divided.
118
 Marshall was thinking in terms of 
further European operations, King felt that the United States had done enough in Europe and 
should return their focus to the Pacific while Arnold was more concerned about establishing his 
Air force as an independent organization than actually winning the war. Due to the wide array of 
interests for United States, the president was not able to pick any of the priorities as a prime one 
but elected to “wait and see” what Churchill had to say.119 
Before the conference, the military chiefs planned to meet, on January 13, 1943 before 
Roosevelt arrives the day after. King and Marshall
120
 decided to come up with some kind of 
common plan to propose to the British. Marshall concluded that the plan for the United States 
should be focused on Europe and not the Mediterranean, but invests more into the Pacific at the 
same time.
121
 Then came time of the meeting when King opened with what he discussed with 
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Marshall. Brooke then expressed his concerns for the 30% of American resources being devoted 
to the Pacific effort, especially in the territories of the British Empire such as Burma or India. 
Churchill feared that the already unstable British holds in those territories that if the United 
States were to gain those positions, their hold on them would forever be lost. Therefore, 
Churchill much preferred those positions be reclaimed by the British Empire. After a few 
meetings between the combined Chiefs of Staff, nothing was settled. Roosevelt arrives at 
Casablanca on the afternoon of January 14, 1943. 
 There were three priorities regarding the future of the Western Allies 1) preparing for the 
invasion of Northern France 2) exploiting the momentum in North Africa and 3) containing 
Japan.
122
 The priorities just lined up differently. The United States was the only one holding 
Japan back. Thus, supporting their troops in the Pacific became one of the priorities. The British 
priority was to use their success in North Africa to its maximum capacity. After much 
discussion, the Western Allies finally found the compromise. The British, who had a difficult 
time arguing for their mission to attack Sicily after Tunisia fell, managed to gain American 
support by letting American continued their effort in the Pacific, all the while continuing the 
build up of military forces for the second front at Northern France. No allocation of resources 
was changed.
123
 Churchill and Roosevelt accepted the arrangement. The Allies were one step 
closer to closing the ring on Germany. 
On January 23, the Allies summarized their strategies as follows: 1) Take Sicily to 
establish the pathway to Italy from Mediterranean and give Russia the long promised second 
front as a diversion 2) From the British Isles, keep the pressure on Germany, utilizing intensified 
bombing while building up forces for the cross-channel invasion 3) For the United States: hold 
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Japan back using minimal resources to not affect the European theatre 4) For Great Britain: 
while invading Sicily, must also continue delivering supplies by Arctic convoys to Russia.
124
 
Neither side got what they aimed for but the end results were at the very least satisfactory in 
terms of military strategies.
125
 
The Casablanca Conference ended well in terms of future strategies for the Allies and to 
the eyes of the World, Churchill and Roosevelt apparently helped reforge French unity joining 
De Gaulle‟s Free French with the Vichy forces under Giraud. Another development that came 
out of the conference was Roosevelt‟s off-hand mention of the Allies fighting the Axis until they 
accepted unconditional surrender. Though casually uttered, the statement had some effects on the 
Allies due to its poorly defined meaning not really being understood. Roosevelt thought that by 
including unconditional surrender of the Axis as an Allied war aims, it would force Russia to 
keep fighting Hitler without signing any separate treaty with them.
126
 The president also believed 
that Russia would also be forced into fighting Japan who at the moment were not at war with 
Russia. 
Churchill thought it to be unnecessary, while also being aware that such condition might 
be a slight hindrance. Churchill thought that by declaring such condition, it would undermine the 
effort of the local resistance groups such as Germany as well as motivate the inhabitants of the 
nation to unite with their oppressors and fight against the outsider.
127
 Stalin, contrary to 
Roosevelt‟s beliefs, would have seen it as an opportunity to gain territories. By not being 
allowed to accept surrender, the Red Army can sweep everything in their way on their way to 
Germany all the while occupying areas without a halt. Ultimately however, what the leaders 
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thought about the statements was largely inconsequential. The statement implied that the Allied 
effort finally progressed to the step in which they no longer had to worry about losing to the Axis 
but rather to the point where they designed their victory. On January 24, 1942, the Casablanca 
conference was over and each personnel returned to assume their responsibilities. 
 As mentioned earlier, the Allies had gained momentum ever since the British victory at 
El Alamein. As of the emergence of Tehran Conference on November 28, 1943, the future was 
looking bright for the Allies. The Guadalcanal Campaign beginning in November 12, 1942 
concluded as the first major American victory in the Pacific on February 9, 1943 when the 
American Navy declares Guadalcanal secured. Following Montgomery‟s penetration through the 
Mareth Line on March 28, 1942, the American troops from the initial TORCH landing at Oran, 
Tunisia on November 8, 1942 finally joined up with Montgomery‟s Eighth Army pursuing 
Rommel‟s unit128 from Egypt to the Mareth Line in Tunisia on April 7, 1943. Rommel retreated 
to an airfield in Enfidha, Tunisia and eventually retreated Tunisia completely on May 7, 1943. 
Beginning in November 29, 1943, Stalin managed to stop Hitler who just weeks earlier 
were unstoppable, at Stalingrad. Ever since then, Stalin‟s troops continued to advance westward 
reclaiming territories lost during the days he utilized the scorched earth policy just to survive. 
Finally, the Western Allies managed to use the second front to support Russia. On June 9, the 
Allies landed in Sicily along with political Turmoil in Italy resulting in Mussolini being arrested 
on July 26 and Italy surrendered the Allies on September 8, 1943. Hitler was forced to reallocate 
troops to take Italy and reinstall Mussolini on September 11, weakening their forces combating 
Stalin at Kharkov spelling Hitler‟s doom on the Eastern front. By the time of the Tehran 
Conference, Stalin‟s troops not only managed to win back their Russian territories including 
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Caucasus, Stalingrad, Kursk, and Kharkov but also managed to reach Kiev, Ukraine in early 
November. 
In addition to major victories on land, the Allies also had been successful in naval 
warfare as well as in strategic bombing. British victory at the Battle of the Barents Sea on the 
very last day of 1942 turned the table. Even though the British Navy suffered heavy convoy 
losses in the Atlantic in mid-March, 1943, they made their return during “Black May,” just two 
months afterwards. The “Wolf Pack,” a U-boat fleet commanded by German Admiral Karl 
Donitz accumulated heavy losses during April due to technological advancements. On May 22, 
1943, Donitz‟s Wolf Pack retreated from North Atlantic. As for the Allied strategic bombing, the 
combined might of the US Air Force and British Royal Air Force managed to apply heavy 
pressure on Germany especially after the POINTBLANK directive
129
 had been issued on June 
14, 1943 aimed to destroy any potential air power of the Axis in order to secure complete air 
superiority for the Allies in the future.  
Because the military effort was going well, the prospect of the post-war world came into 
question. Ever since as early as the Casablanca conference, Roosevelt, despite not having 
decided the future strategies for United States, he was certain that the Mediterranean should not 
have been one. The president was beginning to agree with Marshall that Churchill‟s decisions 
were merely for diversion. Despite his decision to support TORCH in 1942, which was partly to 
appeal to the public and partly to observe French politics, even Roosevelt have had enough of 
Churchill procrastinating to help the Stalin establish the second front. 
Though fully aware that Churchill did not trust Stalin, Roosevelt ignored and at times 
even dismissed Churchill. Roosevelt even tried, unsuccessfully, to arrange a meeting with just 
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Stalin and him in May 1943 for a chance to earn Stalin‟s trust. Roosevelt was less concerned 
about what Churchill aimed to achieve from buying time than the fact that it postponed the cross-
channel invasion which Stalin expected to happen since 1942 but, to his disappointment, 
appeared to be postponed until 1944.
130
 Stalin asked for an attack on Germany, not the 
roundabout second front like attacking Sicily. As a result, Roosevelt was much more anxious to 
meet Stalin than meeting Churchill in order to ensure his future cooperation.
131
 
March 1943, British Foreign Secretary Eden came to Washington to meet the president 
on Churchill‟s behalf. Though the conversation was mostly inconclusive, Roosevelt did show his 
attitude about the post-war world. He illustrated his vision of the post-war world to Eden of 
having four great nations, being the Big Three and China, policing the peace of the world 
together. Related to this idea was the plan to create the United Nations which would include 
Russia‟s cooperation. Though not mentioned, Roosevelt felt that if any nation would have a 
problem with his postwar plans, it would be the British. Roosevelt had a special distrust for the 
British. He felt as if the British spheres of influence, whether in Asia, Africa or in Europe would 
always be sources of unrest especially to Russia which could not help but to be paranoid from 
being under attack for the last twenty five years.
132
 
Additionally, Roosevelt simply came to not trust Churchill in general around the time he 
advocated for further Mediterranean operations in 1943. He felt that the prime minister had 
questionable motives, ranging from his refusal to properly deliver supplies to Russia, to his 
obsession with the Mediterranean, his idea of restoring France as a military power and above all 
else was his apparent distrust for the Soviet Union. From his observation, Roosevelt sensed the 
Russia-Britain rivalries on the horizon and he aimed to prevent it from happening.  
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In addition to his cold logical way of thinking, much like any other dictator, Stalin was 
obsessed with his own safety.
133
 Therefore, he was not capable of trusting someone based on 
words without anything to show for. To Roosevelt, Churchill could be dealt with more easily 
than Stalin, who was distrustful towards both Churchill and Roosevelt. Therefore, Roosevelt‟s 
policies were focused around the hope to secure Stalin‟s cooperation for the post-war future by 
signaling both Churchill and Stalin that the United States was to not take the British side. These, 
until the very moment of his death, were the president‟s utmost priorities. 
Unfortunately, his endeavors to earn Stalin‟s trust did not prove fruitful. Stalin had little 
regard for what he can offer the Allies when he made his demands. He was the only one fighting 
Hitler and his people already lost so many lives when the Western Allies could not even give 
him a second front. He asked for the second-front in 1942 but the support only came through two 
years late. 
If anything, he was in this alliance only for the survival of the Soviet Union and his so-
called allies did nothing to aid him while he was doing the leg work to prevent them from certain 
doom. If anything, he felt that he had every right to be upset and suspicious of the Allies and 
nothing the Allies could have done would have earned his trust. During the fall of Italy, Stalin 
was upset that the Allies did not even consult him about her surrender. Stalin already had bad 
feelings towards the Allies from the delayed second front except for Italy.
134
 Therefore, the 
action of having Italy surrender for shock value damaged the relationship even more. 
Around the time of the Third Washington (TRIDENT) Conference in May 1943, 
Roosevelt finally supported Marshall in opposing further operations in the Mediterranean unless 
Churchill can do it without slowing down the military buildup in Great Britain. As a result, 
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during the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in August of 1943, Churchill, for the first time, 
mentioned a possible date for the cross-channel operation, codenamed “OVERLORD”, to be in 
May 1944.
135
 Stalin was somewhat relieved that what he asked for a year ago was to finally 
come to fruition even though it would be within a year later. With the enormous increase in 
momentum for the Allies and the questions for the future finally coming into the picture, the Big 
Three finally agreed to meet up to describe their endgame at the Tehran Conference. 
From the very beginning of the meeting, Churchill and Roosevelt already began growing 
distant. Arriving on November 28, 1943, Roosevelt met Molotov upon his arrival. Molotov then 
told the president that there was a Nazi plot to assassinate one of the Big Three and the fact that 
the American Legation was located further away from the British Legation and Russian Embassy 
might have made traveling dangerous. Stalin then invited Roosevelt to stay in a villa near the 
Russian Embassy which Roosevelt accepted. Churchill initially viewed the arrangement with 
optimism that it was arranged for the security purposes but he would soon learn its true nature as 
Stalin was able to listen in on all FDR‟s conversations. 
Throughout the entire conference, Roosevelt did not spend any time meeting exclusively 
with Churchill but spent a great amount of time with only Stalin and despite the prime minister‟s 
efforts, Roosevelt did not budge. Churchill then conceded and accepted that he was to deal with 
Stalin on his own. During those times Roosevelt discussed a few topics with Stalin ranging from 
the immediate concerns such as his idea to let bombers refuel in Russia after bombing Hitler to 
political matters such as the United Nations. Stalin showed obvious interest in strategic bombing 
of Germany and did not care much for the prospect of the United Nations especially after China 
was mentioned. Stalin came to this conference only for one purpose and that was to get a clear 
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commitment for OVERLORD
136
 from the Western Allies and to prevent the Allies from 
reinforcing Italy or landing troops in the Balkans. Then the conversation went back to the future 
of Germany to discuss with Stalin instead.  
The next day, the Big Three met for the first time. Despite the increasing momentum, the 
Allies were not so hasty to only discuss the postwar future. Their main focus was still on the war 
at hand and how to end it.
137
 After all the formalities were over, Stalin went straight to the point 
and asked who was to command OVERLORD and until that was decided, Stalin did not believe 
in the Western Allied commitment for the second front. Roosevelt had not decided the 
commander for the operation but was accidentally saved by Churchill who apparently was not 
aware that Stalin did not want to hear about his Mediterranean strategies. Churchill did not get to 
say much until Stalin interrupted stating that he was only here to talk about OVERLORD and he 
wanted a solid date, not a vague commitment. Churchill then tried again by mentioning the idea 
of bringing Turkey into war
138
 only to be silenced by Stalin who made his point clear that he was 
not there to talk about diversions. Roosevelt then broke up the tension and asked that the 
Western Allies to reconvene the next day to come up with answers before meeting Stalin.
139
 At 
this stage, Churchill realized that he was already alone; Roosevelt already sided with Stalin on 
operation OVERLORD. However, Churchill‟s suffering for the day was still not over. 
Stalin hosted dinner for the Allies on the same day. As the dinner went on, it seemed like 
Stalin still had some animosity toward Churchill who (to Stalin) made OVERLORD difficult. 
The tension earlier brought out the bully in Stalin. He decided to give Churchill a test of will. 
Stalin mentioned the idea of shooting fifty to a hundred thousand Nazis just to lower their future 
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war capacity. Still bothered from the thought of Stalin and Roosevelt ganging up on him, 
Churchill took the casual remark seriously. Churchill then easily took the bait and replied that the 
British parliament including him will never condone acts such as mass execution and would 
rather be shot himself than being a part of it. In an effort to lessen the tension, Roosevelt tried to 
reduce the conversation to a joke by mentioning that forty nine thousand Nazis should have been 
enough. After some exchanges, Churchill stormed off only to be invited back in by Stalin who 
went out to see Churchill and told him that it was simply a joke. Left with no alternatives, 
Churchill rejoined the party. Churchill was mentally spent after dinner as not only Great Britain 
not being able to sell any of their plans that day and Roosevelt was largely siding with Stalin the 
confrontations were also overwhelming even for him. Roosevelt essentially sold Churchill out to 
please Stalin. 
Despite his lack of confidence in the feasibility of OVERLORD, Churchill gave up his 
will to resist.
140
 He went alone to Stalin and assured the Red Tsar of his commitment in 
OVERLORD by mentioning that his Mediterranean plan might have caused some 
misunderstanding for the Russia but it would not affect OVERLORD. As the three meet later, 
Roosevelt allowed Churchill to inform Stalin of the date he picked which was sometime in May, 
1944. Stalin was pleased about the date for OVERLORD then turned to Roosevelt to ask about 
the identity of its commander in which the president replied that he would give the answer within 
three or four days. November 30, 1943, the final meeting of the Tehran conference ended in that 
fashion. 
Despite their conflict, Churchill and Stalin
141
 did agree on the idea that the United States 
should not worry about the Pacific for the moment. Churchill, in particular, was determined to 
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convince Roosevelt to not go through with operation BUCCANEER in the Andaman seas. After 
some exchanges between Churchill and Roosevelt from 4-5 of December, Roosevelt, thoroughly 
annoyed by Churchill, finally gave in on December 5 and decided not to send troops over to the 
Andaman despite Mountbatten‟s demands for more troops which worked into Stalin‟s favor. 
Stalin suspect that Andaman‟s reinforcements would lead to China‟s reinforcement. On 
December 4, Roosevelt also picked Eisenhower
142
 as the commander for OVERLORD and 
brought the news to him personally in Tunis on December 7, 1943.
143
 
Despite being the first meeting of the Big Three, the Allies only managed to agree on a 
few topics from the Tehran conference. The major accomplishment was the establishment of the 
OVERLORD strategy which had been nothing more than a vague possibility since 1942. The 
Western Allies was finally able to fulfill the one commitment the Soviet Union asked of. 
Additionally, Stalin was also on board with the ideas of Allied bombers refueling in Russia to 
improve their efficiency in the strategic bombing of Germany. 
Roosevelt and Stalin then met up privately afterwards. In an extra effort to please Stalin, 
Roosevelt also allowed Stalin a free hand in Poland as well as the rest of Eastern Europe. Stalin 
once claimed that he felt responsible for the fate of Poland and he intended to personally make 
amends and therefore, he would participate in Polish politics as well as move the border of 
Poland westward into Germany. The president did not seem to object the idea since he only 
asked for Stalin to understand his position as the American presidential election was coming up. 
Roosevelt explained that there were many Americans of Polish descent and he intended to win 
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their votes and therefore he was not supposed to answer Stalin on the matter.
144
 Additionally, 
Roosevelt had the confidence that despite the rights to self-determination that he promoted, the 
Baltic States would still join the Soviet Union. Additionally, he also mentioned that this matter 
would not be something the United States would go to war over, ensuring Stalin his free hand in 
the future of Poland.
145
 Stalin then suggested to the president that some propaganda work should 
be done.
146
 
Additionally, the three also agreed to postpone whatever ideas they did not agree upon to 
be discussed after Germany was defeated. Due to the condition that Stalin did not care for much 
else but OVERLORD, there were several topics being introduced but did not amount to much. 
One of them was the establishment of the United Nations to prevent war in the future which 
Stalin did not care much for especially when they were still fighting Germany. Another was the 
idea of using the Siberian airfields for the bombing of Japan in which Stalin refused.
147
 The 
Allies ended up not agreeing to many agendas but at least the priority was fixed on 
OVERLORD. The war then resumed with Russia still on the offensive drive towards Germany. 
Great Britain continued their Arctic convoys to Russia while operating in the Mediterranean as a 
side project. The United States dedicated all resources to build up for D-Day on May 8, 1944. 
Leading the charge for the Allies, Russian troops were unstoppable on their westward 
drive. By the end of 1943, the Red Army already reclaimed their positions and was liberating 
Ukraine and by January 4, the Red Army marched past Ukraine and entered Poland, reaching 
Warsaw at the end of July. Seeing Stalin‟s troops arriving near Warsaw, the Polish resistance 
group initiated the Second Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. To the Germans‟ surprise, at the most 
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crucial moments of the resistance, Russia‟s westward invasion paused just outside of Warsaw 
without extending any help to the resistance, allowing the Nazis to annihilate the resistance 
group. 
Stalin claimed that he was against interfering with internal affairs of Poland and the 
Allies should not support the Polish resistance group. Stalin also claimed that the 
counteroffensive was strong and the Red Army had to concentrate their efforts which prevented 
them to support the uprising anyway. Despite his claims, Stalin‟s true intention was likely to be 
letting the Germans exterminate the future resistance against his puppet government in Poland 
after the war. After the resistance was defeated, the Red Army easily claimed Warsaw on 
January 17, 1945 as well as liberated Auschwitz, in on the 26th all the while “liberated”148 the 
rest of Eastern Europe. The Western Allies became increasingly concerned about Stalin‟s 
scheme. 
The United States and Great Britain operated as a single unit in the Mediterranean, the 
European theatre as well as some effort in the Pacific at this stage. The Western Allies were 
responsible for the strategic bombing of Germany and Italy along with the areas which were yet 
to be liberated such as Holland, Greece and Belgium until the ground troops reached the area and 
liberate them. At long last, the long promised D-Day came on June 6, 1944, the combined forces 
of Canada, France and Britain landed on the beach at Normandy. France was the first to be 
liberated on August 25, 1944. With the landing secured, the Allies advanced eastward on a race 
to reach Berlin. 
The most difficult battle for the Allies was the event known as the Battle of the Bulge 
beginning on December 16, 1944, a counteroffensive from Germany towards the American 
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divisions near the Ardennes forest. The battle lasted a month, incurring heavy losses on both 
sides and ended in the Allied victory on January 16, 1945, less than a month away from 
Roosevelt‟s very last conference at Yalta. Around the time of Yalta conference, Russia had 
already reached Germany, but the Allies had not even reached the Rhine. 
Throughout 1944, Stalin was swiftly advancing through Eastern Europe, leaving behind 
troops in every liberated territory. It was not long before the Western Allies learned of the 
consequences. Before the Big Three met at the Yalta conference, both Churchill and Roosevelt 
became increasingly concerned about the “liberations” of nations under Axis by Stalin. During 
the Tehran Conference, the future of Eastern Europe, Poland in particular, was briefly discussed 
but not pursued in great length, therefore leaving no restriction on how Stalin “liberate” them. As 
a result, Churchill proposed the idea of a meeting between the Big Three in June, 1944 and 
Roosevelt agreed that some agreements for Eastern Europe had to be established with Stalin. 
Therefore, Roosevelt contacted Stalin to propose the idea of the meeting between the three in 
Scotland in September. 
Preferring not to be restricted by any agreements, Stalin refused to meet with the Allies 
with the same excuses he used before, which were his health and the fact that he had to 
command the Red Army at all times. The Red Tsar did offer to send over his Foreign Minister 
Molotov, who both Roosevelt and Churchill believed, would be even less receptive to their 
proposals than Stalin himself. Despite Stalin‟s response, Churchill refused to give in as he 
decided to travel to Moscow in person to negotiate and ended up staying there from October 9 to 
18, 1944. Despite the prime minister‟s full effort, he only managed to secure future freedom for 
Greece and nothing else, not even a meeting in the near future.
149
 
                                               
149
 Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace, p. 25 
Siripoonsap 
- 59 - 
 
Stalin was not opposed to the idea of an eventual meeting of the Big Three but buying 
time worked into his favor because his army was performing well. Therefore, Stalin accepted 
that there would be a meeting but it was to be much later than what Churchill and Roosevelt 
proposed. The meeting was rescheduled to February 2, 1945 due to the request from the 
president for the meeting to take place after his inauguration date on January 20, 1945. Towards 
the end of 1944, Roosevelt‟s health was declining at an astonishing rate as he overexerted 
himself during the campaigns for his presidential election.
150
 Therefore, he proposed the idea of 
the Big Three meeting somewhere closer to the United States. At Tehran, upon seeing 
Roosevelt‟s disability, Stalin promised to be the one traveling to see the president not the other 
way around.
151
 Unfortunately, Stalin did not stay true to his words because, out of sheer paranoia 
for his own safety, he ultimately refused to travel anywhere outside his own territory. The 
meeting being postponed to February 2 worked perfectly in Stalin‟s favor as he had more time to 
expand his influence over the more territories in Eastern Europe before Churchill and Roosevelt 
forced him to discuss the legitimacy of the practice with the Allies. 
While it was true that the British fought alone from 1940 to 1941 almost to the brink of 
annihilation, Churchill was well aware that after 1942, Great Britain had not been contributing 
much to the Allied cause while both the United States and Soviet Russia were prime contributors 
since the very moment they joined the alliance. By that logic, in the later stages of the war, 
Roosevelt and Stalin cared much more about each other‟s opinions while Churchill‟s opinion 
mattered less. Therefore, if Churchill was to be heard at all, he had to get one side to speak for 
him. He then planned to strengthen the bond between the United States and Great Britain which 
he found to be somewhat lacking of late. Before the Yalta Conference, Churchill invited 
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Roosevelt to meet him at Malta for 2-3 days to discuss the stance for the Western Allies. Even 
though Roosevelt ultimately accepted Churchill‟s proposal, the meeting did not achieve as much 
as he planned it to. 
As a response to Churchill‟s insistence for the president to bring his military leaders, 
Roosevelt only sent Marshall and the new Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius over. 
Moreover, instead of staying a few days, Roosevelt decided to stop by Malta only for one 
afternoon, much to the disappointment of Churchill, for the sole purpose of sightseeing before 
flying off to attend the Yalta Conference.
152
 Roosevelt did not want to risk doing anything that 
might cause suspicion in Stalin. Especially with the Pacific theatre unresolved, Roosevelt 
counted on Stalin‟s support against Japan as well as the United Nations.153 
Overall, Roosevelt had mixed feelings about Churchill. Even though, Roosevelt and 
American people in general had special disdain for Great Britain and her practice of 
imperialism
154
 and there were some tensions in the past regarding the procrastination of 
OVERLORD, Churchill eventually fulfilled his role which Roosevelt was also grateful for. 
Unfortunately, Stalin‟s trust was not to be earned easily and as a result, Roosevelt was on good 
terms with Churchill when he can afford to but for the most part chose to accommodate to 
Stalin‟s paranoia to earn his trust because the future of the Allied effort as well as Roosevelt‟s 
version of post-war peace would rely on the cooperation of the mistrustful Red Tsar, not the 
Hero of Britain. 
For the upcoming conference, Roosevelt‟s basic ideas for discussion was to first establish 
the communication line between the Red Army and Eisenhower‟s troops for the troops to operate 
more efficiently and then to see if he could talk Stalin into helping the United States fight Japan, 
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and to discuss the United Nations as well as post-war Eastern Europe and Germany. Considering 
how strong Stalin‟s position was during the most recent war effort, it was apparent that there was 
not much Roosevelt could have done about their occupation of Eastern European regions since 
he missed the chance to approve of the landing in the Balkans that would have kept Stalin in 
check.
155
 Roosevelt only hoped that Stalin would at least put on a guise of decency for the public 
regarding their “liberations” of Eastern Europe. 
Roosevelt and Churchill flew in from Malta then arrived at the conference on February 3, 
1945, but the first formal meeting took place on the evening of February 4. Stalin, who arrived a 
day earlier, took the initiative to see Churchill before the meeting took place. Churchill and his 
advisors informed Stalin about the current offensive strategy mainly from the Mediterranean 
front and Stalin shared the situation of the Red Army preparing for the final push at Germany‟s 
corridor. Before departing, Stalin mentioned a strategy in which Churchill proposed to Roosevelt 
but was rejected during their awkward meeting at Malta which made Churchill regret its 
occurrence. Had he waited until Yalta, Stalin would have backed him up when he presented it. 
After causing a bit of a stir, Stalin left Churchill to prepare for the first formal meeting, the day 
after.
156
 
After visiting Churchill, Stalin repeated the similar process with Roosevelt. At first, 
Stalin mentioned the progress of the Red Army was making up until then to the president.
157
 The 
president then followed up by mentioning the need to establish communications between 
Eisenhower and the Soviet military command to improve the coordination in combat.
158
 As a 
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result, the only solid agreements the Western Allies managed to secure favorably were the ones 
not related to Eastern Europe.
159
 
The Big Three easily agreed on the ideas of 1) The attack on Berlin was to proceed as fast 
as possible, 2) Germany was to be divided in four sections among Allies, three belonging to the 
Grand Alliance and another fell to France 3) Russia agreed to support the United States against 
Japan after Germany was defeated in exchange for the return of their former territories lost to 
Japan during the Russo-Japanese War 4) Despite Stalin‟s past experience from the failure of the 
League of Nations, Roosevelt managed to convince Stalin to agree to the creation of the United 
Nations 5) With the exception of Eastern Europe, Stalin conceded to the Western Allies on the 
topic of free elections for the newly freed territories such as France, Belgium or Holland and so 
on. 
Ultimately, Roosevelt and Churchill had to allow Stalin who already had influence over 
Eastern Europe to put the Polish Provisional Government into power, despite their support for 
the Polish Government in Exile in London
160
 which involved the precision sensitive practice of 
strategic bombing.
161
 The idea would directly benefit the immediate military strategy and was 
therefore supported by Stalin. Roosevelt knew what Stalin wanted to hear, they got along 
incredibly well. Along with actively avoiding meeting Churchill, the president also frequently 
mentioned his anti-British and anti-German attitude to Stalin.
162
 
During the Yalta Conference from the beginning to the end, Stalin dominated the 
conversation. The reason for this apparent upper hand was due to the information which Russian 
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intelligence,
163
 the likes of Alger Hiss who was Roosevelt‟s key negotiator who turned out to be 
a Soviet spy,
164
 gathered for Stalin. Even though the Americans were aware of the Russians‟ 
intentions and took precautions Stalin still managed to gain advantage through the information 
gained.
165
 Stalin knew before the meeting what the priorities for the Allies would be and perhaps 
more importantly, he was aware of their divide. 
Roosevelt informed Stalin that the Western Allies sole purpose of coming to the Yalta 
conference was due to their concern over Poland and Eastern Europe. Therefore, the Western 
Allies was obviously more prepared to debate the future of Eastern Europe.
166
 In terms of 
military strategy, however, the Allies did not have a solid plan of their own due to their lack of 
correspondence in Malta. By assessing the gathered information, Stalin strategized the meeting 
to involve him exploiting the Red Army‟s position and the unpreparedness of the Allies leader at 
the summit to pressure the Western Allies to speed up their invasion on the western border of 
Germany all the while bide time in regarding the topics of the post-war Eastern Europe, 
especially Poland. 
The Yalta Conference was when the Alliance began to fall apart further as the Big Three 
had less reasons to work together ever since the Tehran conference in 1943. Unlike the earlier 
stages where survival forced the three unlikely parties to form an alliance and through difficult 
compromises, the three managed to hold the alliance together into an uncertain future. As of the 
Tehran 1943, the tide had turned and the Big Three were already thinking about their place after 
the war ended. 
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Stalin cared about nothing more than the future safety of the Soviet Union. Stalin simply 
wanted to solve the recurring problems in Russia for the past 50 years which was being attacked 
by Germany by having the sphere of influence over Eastern Europe up to the western border of 
Poland to create a giant buffer zone against future attacks from Europe and for the case of 
Germany, Stalin especially wanted to punish them by demanding heavy reparations as well as 
crippling their economy enough so that they would never rise again. 
Great Britain was mainly concerned about the future of their empire as well as the 
gigantic sphere of influence of Russia. Churchill aimed to recreate the system of the balance of 
power in Europe by restoring France to its former status as well as rebuilding itself through the 
rubble of destruction. Churchill even wanted Germany to rejoin the European community as a 
functioning nation but in order for the balance of power to work, powers do have to be balanced 
out which was not possible with the sphere of influence of Russia especially Poland which 
Churchill wanted to be the future buffer zone against Russia. 
Roosevelt on the other hand wanted to do away with the old systems of peacekeeping 
which failed time again such as spheres of influence and the balance of power.
167
 Roosevelt 
aimed to create a more nuance system which involved the idea of four policemen, namely the 
United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China who would form peacekeeping force of 
the world through the system of the United Nations. And in order for such a system to work, 
nations must have their own autonomy and self-government meaning that the British Empire had 
to give up their former territories and Russia had to allow for free election in Eastern Europe as 
well. The three factions had vastly different views on the matter but the true deciding factors 
boiled down to the influence they had on one another at the end of the war which would affect 
the compromises they came up with. 
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As a result, the only solid agreements the Western Allies managed to secure favorably 
were the ones not related to Eastern Europe. The Big Three easily agreed on the ideas of 1) The 
attack on Berlin was to proceed as fast as possible, 2) Germany was to be divided in four 
sections among Allies, three belonging to the Grand Alliance and another fell to France 3) Russia 
agreed to support the United States against Japan after Germany was defeated in exchange for 
the return of their former territories lost to Japan during the Russo-Japanese War 4) Despite 
Stalin‟s past experience from the failure League of Nations, Roosevelt managed to convince 
Stalin to agree to the creation of the United Nations 5) With the exception of Eastern Europe, 
Stalin conceded to the Western Allies on the topic of free elections for the newly freed territories 
such as France, Belgium or Holland and so on. 
Unlike Churchill whose nation was on the same continent as Russia, Roosevelt‟s main 
concern was to keep the Alliance together and therefore, his concern for Poland as a buffer zone 
was secondary.
168
 Ultimately, Roosevelt allowed Stalin who already had influence over Eastern 
Europe to put the Polish Provisional Government into power, despite their support for the Polish 
Government in Exile in London.
169
 After the Yalta Conference, nothing was able to save Hitler 
from his demise. April 21, the Red Army reached Berlin. In the month of April alone, two of the 
three Axis leaders died in quick succession. Mussolini was executed on the 28th and Hitler 
committed suicide on the 30th of April. The Allies declared its victory in Europe on May 8, 
1945. Nazi high ranking officers were captured and imprisoned shortly after until the Nuremberg 
Trials which took place on November 20, 1945. The Allies then divided Germany and Berlin as 
agreed upon on June 5.  
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The United States successfully tested an atomic bomb technology and successfully 
bombed Japan with it on August 6. August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union held up their end of the 
bargain declaring war on Japan only to see its end the next day when the second atomic bomb 
was dropped in Japan. Japan agreed to the unconditional surrender on August 14, 1945. The 
United Nations Charter was signed on June 26 and the United Nation was born on October 24, 
1945, realizing Roosevelt‟s vision of the postwar future. By the end of 1945, Stalin was the only 
one of the Big Three left. Churchill lost the election and was replaced by Clement Attlee on July 
26, 1945. Roosevelt, with deteriorating health since his presidential election, the youngest of the 
Big Three passed away at the age of 63, having been the only president serving the fourth term in 
the history of the United States. 
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Epilogue 
 April 12, 1945, the 32nd President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who 
managed to keep the condition of his health a secret from the public, died in office at the age of 
63. After the end of Yalta Conference, amidst the grief of the American public, the Grand 
Alliance continued its path to victory without him. Despite being one of the architects of 
victories, Roosevelt did not live long enough to see it, as both the Il Duce and the Fuhrer 
managed to outlive him. The Allies declared victory in Europe on May 7, 1945 and by June 26, 
Germany was divided and the United Nations Charter was signed. Japan also surrendered fairly 
quickly after the European Axis was defeated. After American bombers dropped the two atomic 
bombs on Japan on August 6 and 9, 1945, the very same day, the Soviet Union declared war on 
Japan, Japan also surrendered to the Allies ultimately bringing the Second World War to an end. 
The story of the Allies during the Second World War was a unique one due to the fact 
that it was one of the few times throughout the course of history that an alliance had been 
effective. Despite their differences, the Big Three agreed to work with one another while the 
Axis either hindered one another or simply operated independently. The Axis had very similar 
principles to one another, as the three powers shared an interest in territorial expansion, but the 
only benefit they gained from their alliance was a promise to not attack each other. Italy was for 
the most part a hindrance to Germany, while Japan and Germany simply did not communicate 
because both were focused on the war on their own area of interests. 
Even though none of the principles of the Allies lined up with one another - Churchill 
aimed to retain the British Empire, Stalin aimed to secure the future safety of Russia and 
Roosevelt aimed for the United States to be involved at the global level after the war - they at 
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least shared a priority, which was to defeat Hitler. However, that only begs the question of why 
they fought Hitler and that lined up perfectly 
The question of how they fought and won the war was a different story. Due to the fact 
that the Allies shared an immediate goal but not a long term goal, the Big Three often conflicted 
in their strategic discussions because they involved their national interests (the reason they 
fought Hitler to begin with). The initial concern for the Big Three was winning the war against 
Hitler and the three already had a difficult time agreeing to a joint strategy for a single objective. 
The case became much more severe after TORCH when the Allies managed to gain the upper 
hand and the Big Three were thinking about the postwar future. Still, the three managed to 
adhere to one another due to one shared objective: postwar peace. 
The United States joined the Second World War initially to restore peace to Europe and 
stop the German expansion, and later aimed to advocate for the revised international peace 
organization which would allow the United States to be involved in deciding the future of the 
world. Great Britain was in the war because the balance of power in Europe failed to prevent the 
German aggression which reached as far as the British Isles; she was also concerned about losing 
the dominions over her colonies. The Soviet Union‟s concern remained the same from the 
beginning to the end, which was peace and security for Russia which was the reason for Stalin‟s 
establishment of the buffer states in Eastern Europe. 
Though fully aware the weaknesses of the League of Nations, Roosevelt did believe in 
the idea of an international peace organization like Former President Woodrow Wilson, who 
implemented it. The idea of the United Nations was then created. The basic idea of the United 
Nations was an international body where members would settle their disputes peacefully and 
would collectively use force for peacekeeping if necessary. The reason for the creation of the 
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United Nations was that Roosevelt recognized that the old European systems for world order - 
namely the sphere of influence and the balance of power - simply never worked and it was time 
that the United States stepped in using an improved version of the international peace 
organization. 
The topic most frequently discussed during the Yalta conference was how the voting and 
membership would work. The challenge, in creating an international body including both the 
superpowers like the Big Three and other smaller nations, was to find a common ground that 
would appeal to both bigger and smaller nations in which the three nations had their own 
versions of. Even though peace was the aim of the Big Three, they still aimed to gain as much 
advantage as they can in the Security Council because each believed their version to be the right 
one. 
What Churchill had in mind about the arrangement of the United Nations was that Great 
Britain and, hopefully, France would become two of the five permanent members with veto 
rights. The other members that would support Great Britain would be the nations which the 
British held dominion which would be free in name but would still support Great Britain. 
Therefore Churchill was ambivalent about the voting systems, as he would like the smaller 
nations to be heard but also wanted to be protected by veto rights because he suspected that the 
newly independent nations might be more supportive of the United States that the British 
Empire. 
Despite having helped design the United Nations, Great Britain was still clinging to the 
idea of both the balance of power and the sphere of influence as they still relied on their former 
colonies. Churchill believed that the British Empire, along with France, had to stick together in 
the council against both the United States and the Soviet Union. From the very beginning of the 
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Second World War, one of Great Britain‟s main war aims was to protect the overseas territories 
of her empire. Their strategies during the Second World War were focused more on their own 
overall success around the globe, rather than building up for the second front that was necessary 
to end the war. As a result, Great Britain usually clashed with the United States in terms of their 
tendency to focus on diversions. 
Stalin, on the other hand, was skeptical of their Western Allies about the United Nations 
due to his vastly different views on the concept of Great Powers acting as the peacekeeping 
forces.
170
 He believed that no nation would support him and therefore he was focusing on the 
veto rights for Russia. He especially disliked the fact that the smaller nations were also given the 
rights to speak up especially, when all the countries but two under his sphere of influence were 
not accepted as members.
171
 The Red Tsar felt, as he always did, that the Great Britain and the 
United States were ganging up on him with the United Nations especially when Churchill and 
Roosevelt proposed obvious proxies - namely France and China - to be included at the top of the 
Security Council. He only believed in the absolute veto power for Russia to even stand a chance 
in the United Nations. 
Much like Churchill and Great Britain, Stalin became a part of the Allies to ensure the 
survival of his nation. The difference between the two, however, was the fact that Churchill 
cared about the sustainability of the post-war peace, but Stalin was only concerned about Russia 
not being taken advantage of. As a result, Stalin‟s post war aims were to cripple Germany to the 
point that it could no longer be a threat and to build a sphere of influence expanding from Russia 
to Poland to act as an enormous buffer zone. As soon as the Red Army gained momentum at 
Stalingrad, Stalin made sure that the sphere of influence between Russia and Germany was set up 
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by leaving behind his troops in the areas after he liberated them, even the ones beyond the 
Russian border.. 
As much as Roosevelt and Churchill disliked the fact that Stalin was skeptical of the 
United Nations and unwilling to give up Eastern Europe, they also realized that a plan for peace 
in their time cannot work without the Soviet Union being involved. Roosevelt going out of his 
way just to get through Stalin‟s paranoia, in the hope of him cooperating with the Allies both in 
trying to defeat Hitler and to establish the United Nations was the standing pattern throughout 
the Second World War. Roosevelt had felt that, for as long as the Soviet Union had been a part 
of the Allies, securing the support from Stalin would be the most difficult and yet also the most 
important task he had to do. Even though the United States was on better terms with Great 
Britain, the president chose to go out of his way to avoid interacting with Churchill in a vain 
attempt to convince Stalin that the Western Allies were not ganging up on him. 
Even though Roosevelt continuously leaning towards Stalin‟s side, sometimes even at the 
expense of Churchill ever since the Tehran Conference, he managed to win the Allies the Second 
World War without the alliance being broken apart, it ultimately did not ease Stalin‟s paranoia in 
the slightest. Fortunately, however, despite the differences in their versions of the post-war 
future, the three did share a single common ground: somehow there will be peace. The 
compromise was then made between the Big Three. The Allies decided to accept the basic plans 
for the United Nations with a few compromises for Stalin. The United Nations was established 
on October 24, 1945. Stalin accepted China and France as permanent members in exchange for 
his sphere of influence remaining over Eastern Europe up to Poland. 
Though they did not share ideologies, the Big Three managed to form an alliance and to 
work together until the end, due to them having a common enemy while the Axis powers failed 
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due to the fact that the nature of their ambitions did not allow for much cooperation, leading 
them to their ultimate defeat. As the tide of war turned in their favor, the Allies began to divide 
further as their need for one another had lessened. Skeptical of Stalin, Churchill aimed to get 
Roosevelt to side with him while Roosevelt was trying hardest to not even imply its possibility to 
avoid upsetting the skeptical Red Tsar. Intentionally or not, President Roosevelt managed to 
keep the Big Three working together as a single unit and jointly ended the conflict. Roosevelt 
managed to successfully gain support from the two bitterest enemies and established an 
international peace organization which, while did not prevent the Cold War from happening two 
years later, did lower the bloodshed and lives lost within a few decades that followed. 
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